Political Ignorance: The Barrier to the Sustainable Democratisation of the Thai Political System.

After the first landslide victory of the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) in the January 2001 General Election with 12 million votes, followed by the party’s second landslide victory in February 2005 (18 million votes), Thaksin Shinawatra gained a remarkable degree of confidence in his own political position. His political popularity appeared to be firmly secured with the 16 million votes the TRT received in the April 2006 election after the House of Parliament was dissolved that March; although the result was invalidated that May by the Constitutional Court. The support that the TRT and Thaksin received is notable in Thai political history, because the level of public support enjoyed was unprecedented. Rural constituencies represented the majority of Thaksin’s political base, due largely to his populist public policies and increased public spending, including for example, the ‘one village one million baht scheme’. However, the increasing popularity of Thaksin amongst the rural population was occurring whilst his popularity amongst the urban middle-classes and the academic community was decreasing. This divergence was a major contributing factor in a process of destabilisation, which led ultimately to Thaksin losing political power. Nevertheless, Thaksin’s popularity remains strong in the rural areas of Thailand, even after his ousting during the military-led coup in September 2006 (later called the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR)). The coup took place due to rising accusations of corruption, most specifically in the case of the transaction of Shin Corp to Singapore’s Temasek. However, the support that Thaksin has gained from rural constituencies illustrates how the self-interest and political short-sightedness of voters in rural constituencies can be contributing factors, which impede the development of democracy in Thailand. The exchange of interests between Thaksin and the rural constituencies is clearly defined by the economic interests of rural voters. Thaksin was fully aware that gaining the support of the rural population would ensure that he could control the House of Parliament. In order to gain such support, he learned that economic incentives were the best option. The relationship between Thaksin and the rural constituencies has frustrated the process of democratisation within the Thai political system, because the priority of both sides has been their reciprocal economic interests. Thaksin has argued that the number of votes he received is one of the good indicators for a healthy democracy. However, whilst voter turn-out is one of a number of indicators, a high level of voter participation by itself does not ensure a healthy progressive form of democratisation, so long as there is no real balance of power between the politicians and constituencies. The relationship between Thaksin and the rural constituencies has involved his government delivering policies, in order to favour the rural population, although the rural voters have not exercised any political power they have, in order to influence the decision-making processes. They have a limited interest in contributing to the political debate, as their primary interest is in gaining economic benefits through the political process, as it exists. This perspective, which is held by the rural population, is a consequence of the Thai political culture, where vote-buying and the patronage system unduly influence electoral outcomes. In mature western democracies there is a balancing of power within the political process, where there is an exchange of interests between the politicians and their constituencies. Favourable policies are not launched purely because politicians are aware of the benefits they would expect to reap as a result; although government policies do imply government response to the active influence of their constituencies. Accordingly, constituents become part of the political system, as a result of their contribution to the policy-making process. In relation to the Thai political context, the favourable policies and additional benefits that rural voters had expected from Thaksin were tangible to them, and Thaksin was duly returned to office in both 2005 and in 2006. Thaksin had delivered on these promises, and improvements were clearly evident to the rural voters, with this being directly attributable to Thaksin. This strategy became for both Thaksin and the rural voters, the model, which would ensure a satisfactory outcome for both sides, sustainable for as long as each side achieved their intended outcomes. Thaksin could continue to strongly influence the decision-making process of the rural voters, for as long as he retained their confidence in those benefits continuing. However, this scenario is a one-way relationship, where the side already holding a strong position within the political establishment (Thaksin) can capitalise on the weaker position of the other side (rural population), in order to accomplish their goal first and foremost. Accordingly, the rural population in Thailand are not playing their part within the political system, since they are involved only passively. Thaksin’s handling of the rural constituencies demonstrates the imbalance of power within this relationship. Although Thaksin was well aware of the voting power of the rural population, which could ensure him electoral success, this relationship was both tenuous and precarious. Notwithstanding the September 2006 coup, this relationship is, was, and remains ultimately unsustainable, as it was established only when the conditions were appropriate in Thaksin’s terms. Thaksin was always free to target another group, which could better suit his purposes. The rural population remains subject to the changing political climate in the post (September 2006) coup/ post Thaksin era, because they do not have a direct investment or involvement within the political system. In order to exhibit manifest political influence, any group must have an investment in the political system, so that they can negotiate on a more equal basis with the various powerful actors, which already operate within the political arena. If this were the case in Thailand, then the process of democratisation would be better placed to develop more fully, which could result from a restructuring, rebalancing, and reordering of political power within Thailand. This article is part of the ongoing research entitled ‘The Development of the Sufficiency Economy Framework, and the Political Influence of the Rural Population’, financed by the Thailand Research Fund

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