THE CONCEPT OF ETHICS IN BUDDHISM
1. The General Principle of Ethical Doctrine
Moral philosophers use the term ‘good’ in two important senses. There is the sense in which we speak of what is ‘good as an end’ or what is ‘intrinsically good’. There is also the sense in which we speak of what is ‘good as a means’ or what is ‘instrumentally good’. The two senses are inter-related. For what is instrumentally good, or good as a means, is necessary to bring about what is intrinsically good, or good as an end.
If we acquaint ourselves with the nature of the ethical ideal or the conception of what is intrinsically good or good as an end, we would be in a better position to understand the Buddhist conception of right and wrong.
What is the conception of the ideal? Buddhism conceives of the ethical ideal as one of Happiness, Perfection, Realisation and Freedom. These ethical goals, in fact, coincide, and the highest good is at the same time one of ultimate Happiness, moral Perfection, final Realisation and perfect Freedom. This is the goal to be attained in the cosmic or personal dimension of existence.
The highest good or the ethical ideal for each person is, therefore, conceived of as a state of bliss, mental health, perfection, freedom and realisation. It is a state that is stable (dhuva) and ineffable (amosadhamma) as well.
Buddhism can be conceived as a teaching which guides being in their search for the highest good, which can only be attained by overcoming evil. Generally, the terms “good” and “evil” are used in various ways. In daily life, we often hear such terms used rather loosely : for example, the car is good. However, when the term “evil” is used, it usually refers to the ethical qualities of the thing it is describing. For example, the killing of animals is evil.
As far as ethical studies are concerned, both of the terms “good” and “evil” are inevitable mentioned. The questions such as “what should we do for our own good?” or “what should we do for the good of others or society?” always arise. In this regard, the sum and substance of Buddhist ethics is described as follows : “Not to do any evil, to cultivate the good and to purify one’s mind – this is the teaching of the Buddhas.”
As we well know, there are various uses of every term or word. Something which is said by one person to be “good” might not be good to many others. Looked at from one angle or perspective a certain thing may be good, but not from another. Behavior which is considered good in one area, district or society might not be so in another. The reason for this disparity is the different values which exist in the world.Other words denoting very similar meanings to good and evil, which can be substituted one for the other are : kusala and puñña meaning right and akusala and pāpa meaning wrong.
From the ethical point of view, we normally use the words “good” or “bad,” “right” or “wrong,” kusala or akusala and puñña or pāpa to denote the classes of actions and sometimes the specific actions of human beings. Human actions may be classified as being morally right (kusala), morally wrong (akusala), morally neutral (avyākata) and morally ‘mixed’ (i.e. both right and wrong) in character.
“It makes sense to speak of some acts as being right and others as being wrong or mixed in character, only if human beings are free to act within limits in a causally conditioned world. If a man’s actions were mere responses to stimuli or merely reflected the hereditary structure or constitution of his body or were strictly determined by his psychological past, then it would not make sense to say that his actions were right or wrong, since they are constrained and not free.”
In this way, insane people’s actions are not considered to be right or wrong because the person doing the action does not have intentions.
However, the ethical appraisal of any action or thought varies depending on many factors. An examination of the nature and the characteristics of the actions is needed in order to give responses to questions such as, ‘Which actions are designated right or wrong?’ or ‘What is the measure or what are the criteria which enable us to recognize and distinguish right actions from wrong?’ In this regard, a survey of the opinions of two major philosophical schools of thoughts is necessary.
1. Objective View : The objectivists have held that “acts are right or wrong, irrespective of the person by whom or the time and place at which they are performed.”According to objectivists, rightness or wrongness is absolute and does not very. Its value is not effected by any cause or condition. Among the objectivist theories are metaphysical theories such as those of the theists. They have held either that right actions are right because this is God’s will, that God has willed these actions because they are right, or that God’s will and what is right coincide.
2. Relativist View : The relativists have held that “the notions of right and wrong have differed in different periods of history and in different societies, though they have a relative objectivity within their frames of reference.” Among those who believe right and wrong are relative, Emotivists hold that the rightness or wrongness of actions depends on the thoughts and feelings of human beings. Right actions are actions which all or most people like or approve of, whereas wrong actions are disliked or disapproved of.
Between these two main streams of thought, there are many subdivisions on justifications of right and wrong. To elaborate them in detail is not the purpose here. In short, we hold that, generally, there are two kinds of thoughts the justification of right and wrong or good and evil. In one way, right and wrong are absolute and fixed, not depending on relative factors. In the opposing way of thought, concepts of right and wrong are not static, they change in accordance with the factors concerned.
When we return our gaze to Buddhism, some questions may arise : What is the position of Buddhism regarding ethical propositions and the notions of right and wrong ? To give the precise and accurate answers to the questions, regarding the Buddhist point of view on ethics, we turn to an analysis of the Buddhist scriptures.
2. The Basic of Ethical Idea in Buddhism
In Buddhism, right or wrong is something that can be defined. As we have said earlier, right and good and kusala are synonymous. According to K.N. Jayatilleke, the term “good” is used in two important senses. There is the sense in which we speak of what is good as an end or what is intrinsically good. There is also the sense in which we speak of what is good as a means or what is instrumentally good. These two senses of good are inter-related. In the Buddhist notion, the explanation of kusala (right or good) is given as follows :
1. Ārogaya : free of illness ; that is, the mind free of illness, much as is generally known as ‘a healthy mind’ ; referring to those conditions or factors which support mental health, producing a healthy, untroubled and stable mind.
2. Anavajja : unstained ; the mind that is not stained or murky but clean, polished and clear.
3. Kosalasambhūta : based on wisdom or intelligence ; the quality of mind which contains wisdom, or the various qualities which arise from knowledge and understanding of truth. This corresponds with the teaching which states that kusala conditions have yoniso-manasikāra (clear thinking) as a forerunner.
4. Sukhavipāka : rewarded by well-being ; kusala is a condition which produces contentment. When kusala conditions arise in the mind, there is naturally a sense of well-being without the need for any external influence.
The meaning of akusala (wrong or evil) should be understood in the exact opposite way of the explanation of kusala mentioned above.
3. Ethical Idea Based on the Motivation
Regarding action, the Buddha said, “Bhikkhus, intention, I say, is karma. Having willed, we create karma, through body, speech and mind.”Therefore, in the Buddhist context, karma is intention, which includes volition, will, choice and decision, or the energy which leads to action. Any instance without intention is not regarded as action. Hence without the presence of intention, karma does not exist. In the Buddhist sense, when we talk about action, it means we are talking about intention. Action is motivated by intention.
What is behind the scenes of the action leads to the variety of good actions and bad actions. Upon investigation, we find that our actions are motivated by three skillful (kusala) conditions and three unskillful (akusala) conditions. As the Buddha said :
“What are skillful (kusala) conditions ? They are the three roots of skillfulness – non-greed, non-aversion and non-delusion – and all the defilement which arises from them ; feelings, perceptions, proliferations and consciousness which contain those roots of unskillfulness ; bodily karma, verbal karma and mental karma which have those roots of unskillfulness as a foundation; these are unskillful conditions.”
It is obvious that from the Buddhist standpoint, the first criteria of goodness and badness is the motivation or intent of the actor. If the action is motivated by the root-causes of good action, the action is classified as good. On the contrary, if the action is motivated by the root-causes of bad action, the action is classified as bad. This is the very simple way for us to justify any action. According to this method, it seems that the Buddhist perspective on karma is absolute and static. It seems not to vary according to outer factors. The three root-causes of good action can bring about the good consequences which lead towards the attainment of the highest goal, i.e. Nibbāna. Therefore, by seeing the root-causes, we can justify the end. Therefore, in determining the rightness or wrongness of an action, the motivation or intention is the first factor that out to be considered. From this explanation, it can be summed up that is the volition or intention that makes a state of consciousness or action good or bad. For distinguishing moral criteria, we can justify actions by the presence or absence of moral or immoral roots. The highest good is to be attained by overcoming all evils. Therefore, between the two kinds of the root-cause, the good side is to be cultivate and bad side is to be eliminated.
4. Ethical Idea Based on the Effect of the Action
One of the main criteria of judging an action concerns the question as to whether it constitutes the right means towards the realization of the ultimate goal, or the wrong means for the opposite purpose. According to Buddhism, the ultimate goal for each individual is the attainment of Nibbāna, (the state of highest happiness, moral perfection, supreme realization, utter freedom and perfect mental health).
In this regard, Nibbāna is the criteria for justification of right or wrong action. As we have said many times, whatever means we pursue in the field of Buddhist practice, all are directed towards Nibbāna. And the way leading to Nibbāna, according to the Buddha, is the Eightfold Path. Therefore, the method of justification is that whatever actions correspond to the way of Nibbāna, are right, while other actions which are incompatible with the way towards Nibbāna, are wrong.
The Buddha’s teaching also approaches the judgment of the ethical value of actions from the ends rather than the means :
“When you know for yourselves that these things are unskillful, these things are harmful, these things are censured by the wise, these things, if acted upon, will bring about what is neither beneficial nor conductive to welfare, but will cause suffering, then abandon those things.”
On the level of conventional truth, justification of moral values according to Buddhism is static. Skillful or unskillful action changes according to circumstance, but the actual judgment of the individual’s intention in each circumstance is static. The quality of each intention causes variation in the judgment or value of the action. In other words, the value of an action can be justified by the end which Buddhism specifies as Nibbāna. Therefore, good action, in this regard, is the action leading to Nibbāna.
5. Freewill and the Buddhist Notion of Freedom of Will
The doctrine of karma has been studied by ancient Indian Buddhist, Jain, Brāhmin and Ajīvaka scholars. Despite its prevalence, there are differences as regards the connotations of karma between each school of thought. Here, we would like to distinguish the Buddhist doctrine of karma from the Buddha’s contemporary non-Buddhist notion of karma. One of the purposes of the study is to find out whether there is “free-will” in the Buddhist doctrine of karma.
Before we begin our comparison, it is worthwhile to note that the term freewill is essentially a modern western concept. Therefore, when it is difficult to pinpoint the exact equivalent expression. However, freewill can be roughly defined as
“the unconstained ability to do or act ; the freedom to choose from alternative courses of action without restraint or coercion ; the unhindered capacity to make a conscious, deliberate decision or carry out the course of action which one chooses. However, this unconstrained ability does not mean absolute freedom, a form of absolute liberationism. Freedom is a relative concept and in this particular context, especially when viewed from the Buddhist point of view, has a specific use as a moral and social concept.”
However, in the attempt to understand freewill using the definition given above, we will investigate Buddhist texts keeping in mind that Buddhism is not satisfied with the attainment of simple freewill. Buddhism asserts that beyond freewill lies ‘freedom of will’ which denotes the state of mind unstained by any kind of defilement. Freewill will be the topic discussed first, followed by an elaboration of the Buddhist conception of freedom of will.
6. Freewill in Buddhist Ethics
To make the Buddhist perspective of freewill more clear, we would like to present the concept of karma as thought about and preached upon by various heretical teachers who where the Buddha’s contemporaries. In the Sāmaññaphala Sutta, six heretical teachers are described as “the head of an order, of a following, the teacher of a school, well-know and of repute, as a sophist, revered by the people, a man of experience who has long been a recluse, old and well-stricken in years.”The names of those six heretical teachers are :
Pūrana Kassapa
Makkhhali Gosāla
Ajita Kesakambala
Pakuda Kaccāyana
Sañjaya Belatthiputta
Nigantha Nātaputta.
These six distinguished teachers had different interpretations of the concept of karma and had preached the doctrine of karma in different ways according to their beliefs.
1. Pūrana Kassapa ; He is of the belief that there is neither cause nor condition of the existence of things. Sāmaññaphala Sutta states clearly that he absolutely denies the efficacy of karma, either good or bad, in producing effect. His belief can also be seen in the Sūtrakrtāńga of Jainism which states that “when a man acts or causes another to act, it is not his soul which acts or causes to act.” Therefore, his doctrine is classified by Buddhism and Jainism as akiriyavāda (a believer in non-conditionality).
2. Makkhali Gosāla ; His view is also known as akiriyavāda because, like the former, he believes that soul does not exist, or that it does not act or is not affected by action even on the level of conventional truth. Apart from the denial of the effects of action and energy, he also believes that all beings are subjected to a fixed and unchangeable series of existence, each of which has its own unalterable characteristic. From an ethical point of view, man becomes good or bad without condition. There is no action-and-result, no cause-and-effect. Men are bent this way and that way by fate. Due to this belief, Gosala was also termed a niyatavādin (fatalist). Among the heretical teachers, Makkali Gosala was considered by the Buddha as the most dangerous teacher because he did not acknowledge human responsibility in action. In the Pāli Canon, we find a statement confirming the Buddha’s sentiments towards Gosala : “I know not of any single person fraught with such less to many folk, such discomfort, such sorrow to devas and men, as Makkali Gosala, the infatuate.”
3. Ajita Kesakambala. The doctrine of karma according to Ajita Kesakambala was recorded in the Pāli Text thus :
“There is no such thing, O king, as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next.”
Accordingly, his doctrine of karma is like that of materialism, because he denies the possibility of karma and rebirth. By upholding this doctrine, he was known as ucchedavādin (annihilationist).
4. Pakudha Kaccāyana. In the connection with the doctrine of karma, Pakuda teaches that there are seven eternal elements, and that no matter what we do, no change can affect the eternal elements. In the same way Pakuda postulates that whatever may happen to a person in his life has no affect on the soul. Hence, no merit or demerit can achieve anything. This way of thought denies the moral value of action. Because Pakuda teaches that the soul and the world are both eternal, giving birth to nothing new, steadfast as a mountain peak or a pillar firmly fixed, he is known as a sassatavādin (eternalist).
5. Sañjaya Belatthiputta ; According to the Pāli Canon, Sañjaya Belatthiputta was depicted as an amarāvikkhepikā (eel-wriggler). When he was asked a question, he would not answer the question directly, instead would try to wiggle out of it, like an eel, without giving a specific answer. For example,
“If you ask me about the beings produced by chance ; or whether there is any fruit, any result of good or bad actions ; or whether a man who has won the truth continues, or not, after death, to each or any questions I give the same reply.”
Due to this type of vague approach to questions, we do not get any hint of his thought about karma. By this attitude, he was criticized by the King Ajātasattu as the most foolish of all the celebrated teachers.
6. Nigantha Nātaputta ; In the Jaina tradition, Nigantha Nātaputta is known as Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, the twenty-fourth Titthankara (teacher) of Jainism. Among the six heretical teachers, he is the only person whose teaching has remained a living religion. According to him, soul is permanent and karma is regarded as a tangible substance. This karma-matter accumulated around the soul during the infinite number of past lives (karmanasarīra) encircles the soul as it passes from birth to birth. In the initial stage, when it enters the jīva (body), it is very small, but having entered once, it expands itself so as to fill up the jīva entirely. When it is about to leave the body, it resorts to contraction and comes out of the body as a minute particle. The annihilation of old karma is possible by practicing austerities and the prevention of new karma is possible by inactivity. According to Jainism, bodily action and verbal action are more important than mental action. Therefore, the meaning of karma according to Jainism is definitely different from that of Buddhism. Unlike Buddhism, Jainism holds that committing bad action, with intention or not, leads to the same result. “The man who commits murder or who harms in any way a living being, without intent, is none the less guilty, just as a man who touches fire is burned.”Accordingly, Nigantha Nātaputta is known as a believer in kiriyavāda (the doctrine of action).
These six masters were rivals of the Buddha ; both the Buddha and his disciples criticized the doctrine of these men. For example, Pūrana Kassapa teaches that evil actions have no ensuing guilt (pāpa) or bad result, and good actions achieve no good results; in other words, there is no correlation of action and result on a moral basis or on an ethical criterion. No moral law ensures desirable consequences for virtue and undesirable results for vice. Morality, if Purana would even recognize it, has no application to actions. This teaching shows that there is no relation between action and goodness or badness. Human action is one thing, virtue and vice is another. Moral responsibility is unnecessary for their existence according to Pūrana. Pūrana’s doctrine tends to be part of annihilationism. According to him, happiness or suffering is haphazard and without cause and effect.
Despite his denial of moral causation and the result of moral action, Makkali Gosāla accepts the possibility of ultimate moral purification independent of human action. He admits that, in the course of his samsāric (worldly) sojourn, an individual experiences happiness (sukha) and suffering (dukkha) and finally attains his purification, terminating his suffering through the implied agency of his fate (niyati). According to Makkali, the way to purification is not controlled by the individual :
“There are… 84000 great kalpas through which wise and foolish alike will take their course and make an end of sorrow. There is no question of bringing unripe karma to fruition, nor of exhausting karma already ripened, by virtuous conduct, by vows, by penance, or chastity. That cannot be done. Samsāra is measured as with a bushel, with it joy and sorrow and its appointed end. It can neither be lessened nor increased, nor is there excess or deficiency of lt. Just as a ball of thread, when thrown, unwinds to its full length, so foolish and wise alike will take their course, and make an end of sorrow.”
This passage, clearly illustrates the fatalism and determinism in Makkali’s world view. He believes that all living beings are determined from the moment of their creation and that any kind of moral justification is useless; any kind of good or bad action bears no fruit. When the time comes, he believes, all people will automatically be delivered from suffering.
The Buddha did not agree with these two masters on the basis that their teachings were deficient ; neither acknowledged the existence of freewill and moral responsibility. Without these two components, the teaching of karma bears no fruits. They upheld the wrong views. And the upholding of wrong views, according to the Buddha, is classified into three groups, namely :
Pubbekatahetuvāda : The belief that all happiness and suffering arise from previous karma (past-action determinism)
Issaranimmanahetuvāda : The belief that all happiness and suffering are caused by the creation of a Supreme Being (theistic determinism).
Ahetuvāda : The belief that happiness and suffering are random, having no cause (indeterminism or accidentalism).
Besides Sañjaya Belatthiputta, who preached in the in the eel-wriggled style, these heretical teachers tend to uphold one or two of these three wrong views on karma. We may categorize these teachers roughly as :
1.Pūrana Kassapa is of accidentalism
2.Ajita Kesakambala is of accidentalism
3.Pakuda Kaccāyana is of theistic determinism
4.Nigantha Nātaputta is of past-action determinism.
Makkhali Gosāla does not fall directly into these categories. Instead, he can be termed a straight determinist because he does not recognize a Supreme Being like the theistic determinists choose to do.
The Buddha spoke against all of these divergent views. The Buddha responded to those who do not believe in the responsibility of man for his actions. He disagreed with past-action determinism as follows :
“Bhikkhus, of those three groups of ascetics and Brahmins, I approach the first group and ask, ‘I hear that you uphold this teaching and view… Is that so?’ If those ascetics and Brahmins, on being thus questioned by me, answer that it is true, then I say to them, ‘if that is so, then you have killed living beings as a result of karma committed in a previous time, have stolen as a result of karma done at a previous time, have engaged in sexual misconduct… have uttered false speech… have held wrong views as a result of karma done in a previous time.’
Bhikkhus, adhering to previously done karma as the essence, there is neither motivation nor effort with what should be done and what should not be done…
In the same sutta, the Buddha uses the same reasoning to dismantle the second and the third wrong views. In his argument, we see a clue to the concept of freewill in the sentence “there is neither motivation nor effort with what should be done and what should not be done.” Though, there is no direct reference to freewill in this text, this statement concerning motivation and effort is an indirect assertion of freewill. Despite its conditioned state, freewill is the ability to choose what is morally good and what is morally bad. Buddhism also accepts the premise that if this ability is not present, the purpose of living the religious-life (brahmacariya), which has Nibbāna, and the release from the bond of samsāric existence as its goal, becomes completely futile.
The Ańguttaranikāya records an instance where a certain Brahmin questioned the Buddha regarding the problem of individual ‘agency’ and thus cast light upon the Buddhist position on freewill. The Brahmin said that he holds the view that there is no self-agency (atta-kāra) or external agency (para-kāra) and asked for the Buddha’s views. The Buddha pointed out the fallacy of this view and demonstrated the fact that individuals possess thoughts which allow them to initiate actions according to their choices. A number of terms are used to bring out this idea of initiative : ārabbha (initiative effort, inception of energy), nikkama (endurance, exertion), parakkama (striving, endeavor), thāma (resistance), thiti (persistence), and upakama (undertaking). These words in one way or another, connote the ability of voluntary initiation of action in accordance with one’s choice of the course of that particular action.
Buddhism accepts the importance of previous karma to some degree but does not agree with the doctrine of past-action determinism which holds that happiness and suffering arise only from previous actions in previous lives. According to that view, we do not have freewill or any choice because we are already determined by previous actions. But according to the view of the Buddha, previous karma is seen in a cause-and-effect process, in accordance with the law of Paticcasamupāda. It is not a super-natural force to be clung to or submitted to passively. Although past-actions can effect our present state, in the continuous process of karma, from the past to the future, at any moment we still have choice or are free to initiate new karma; we have freewill. The following example given be P.A. Payutto makes this concept quite clear :
“If a man climbs to the third floor of a building, it is undeniably true that his arriving is a result of past action, that is walking up the stairs. And having arrived there, it is impossible for him to reach out and touch the ground with his hand, or drive a car up and down there. Obviously, this is because he has gone up to the third floor. Or, having arrived at the third floor, whether he is too exhausted to continue is also related to having walked up the stairs. His arrival there, the things he is able to do there and the situation he is likely to encounter, all are certainly related to the old karma of having walked up the stairs. But exactly which actions he will perform, his reactions to the situations which arise there, whether he will take a rest, walk on, or walk back down the stairs and out of that building, are all matters which he can decide for himself in that present moment, for which he will also reap the results.”
The passage implies that although present action is influenced by previous actions, the choice to create new action is still reserved for the individual. It is obvious that the human is free to choose and freewill is inherent in the human’s decision making process. Because of free-will, we are not merely the slaves of the past. We can choose to initiate good things in life. At any rate, this process of freewill can be possible only if it coincides with the doctrine of Dependent Origination (conditionality). It is this point which creates the differentiation between Buddhism and Jainism. While the later holds strictly that we are determined by previous action and we cannot change, the former believes that despite having been influenced by previous karma, by the intervention of paticcasamuppāda (Dependent Origination) one can gradually eradicate the old karma and initiate new karma by one’s own choice and agency.
In summation, Buddhism asserts the reality of human freedom or freewill without denying that this freewill was conditioned but not wholly shaped or determined by the effects of previous factors. Freedom of choice lies at the very heart of Buddhist ethics. The possibility of our refraining from evil and doing good, depends upon the fact that our choices and decisions are not strictly and wholly determined and in this sense are free.
By exercising his own freewill a human being can change his own nature for the good of himself as well as others. In this way, man is master of his own fate.
