Evidence Based Governance

Evidence Based Governance  

Thailand government appears to be in crises from its own policies and its failures to justify (legal conditions for) the loans to fund its policies. The two megaprojects ('blockchain digital wallet' and the Chumpon-Ranong Landbridge project) are massive enough to rise to the surface for public viewing. Many more smaller projects are yet to surface and many will also be controversial, unjustified in direction, scope and/or operations. Why is this so? How can the government reduce opposition and become more effective in governing the country as it sets out to do? 
 
Analyses on the two megaprojects (above) show that both are not "evidence based policies" (meaning that they do not have evidence for the 'need' (requirements), no evidence to support the 'solution' (changes and methods) and no evidence to justify the 'cost and benefit' (return for investment). Lacking (scientific) evidence generates reactions - both 'for and against' from various and sundry bases, and results in (often) negative views and oppositions for the policies. Persevering on such (no-evidence based) polices may also be illegal and prosecutable with jail sentences. 
 
On the other hand, when policies are based on [scientific] evidence, their justifications are defensible (very likely demonstrable by either scientific methods and/or surveys), their solutions are defensible similarly. Strategies and methodologies can be defended by cost and other key measures.

Reviews of evidence based policies are still required to ensure quality, compliance (to standards and legal constraints), cost and to provide [historical data] 'evidence for other policies and projects'.

What do [politicians in] opposition do then? There are still issues of [new or contradicting] evidence, targeting, coverage, timing and/or scoping, budget or funding and so on to be ironed out for the best interest of the people and the country.

[For more information on __evidence-based policy__ see: eg.
The politics of evidence-based policy making - ‎Paul Cairney, 2016 - Cited by 1125  
Evaluation, policy learning and evidence‐based policy making - Ian ‎Sanderson, 2002 - Cited by 1463   
https://onlinecourses.bsg.ox.ac.uk/blog/guide-to-evidence-based-policymaking    
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105460  --(US) Government Accountability Office   
* see also __evidence based medical__ for historical support of the evidence based approach. ]
 
A short preview of Chumpon-Ranong Landbridge project:
- the need for this Landbridge : for Thailand - only to offer a service to shipping and ?local employment
-- Would that service be required? Only when it can reduce cost or time significantly. The landbridge would reduce the traveling distance but not time nor cost; cost and time can significantly increase by docking, unloading, loading, road or rail freighting and insurance (as handling incurs more risk over more time)
**revising stowage plan (arranging containers stacking) on ships is a 'significant' task with computers.
-- As shipping Destination Thailand
--- deep sea ports on the Pacific oceans -- there are at least 3 ports now (A deep sea port at Chumpon can cut fish spawning route and pollute the breeding grounds [most shipping vessels are 20-30 years old], this can jeopardize fishing industry which is worth about THB200,000 millions/year) 
--- deep sea port on the Indian oceans -- is lacking (trades to and from Indian subcontinent, Middle East and (via Suez Canal) European and African countries could benefit by a deep sea port at Ranong (or West Coast) but road or rail freight service [North to Bangkok and beyond, and South to Had Yai and beyond] would be required (**not listed in the proposal)
--- one other [much lower cost; destination port] solution may be - to complete Dawei Deep Sea Port Project in partnership wit Myanmar and China (for road and rail freight ways)

- it is already clear that the Landbridge is not an evidence based policy; failing to provide clear 'need', failing to provide coverage on possible use and required networking, and no clear evidence of return for investment.  Let us send it back to have more supporting evidence included.
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[Some additional notes: Edited 28/1/2567 to clarified the notes

2023-10Oct TH land bridge may save some distance but won't save time as ' additional unld, truck, load add cost and risk/insurance premium   
2023-11Nov:==Gulf of Thailand max depth 85m avg 58m; land bridge Chumphon-Ranong 90km + rails and roads from port-to-port, no provision for ‘parking’ of [loaded/empty] containers on terminal.

==expecting 20M TEUs/yr, 55K/day, 2300/h, 3.8/min; x?%/85K vessels: normal speed 20-25 knots; 37.0 – 46.3 km/hr; upto 1000TEU (1-3 days to LD/UL, at 5-6 containers/min);  -→cannot save time nor cost!

 ld/unld have parameters to ensure safety of people and ships (or vehicles), so a level of saving time and saving men and equipment is maintained. This includes the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code, developed as a uniform international code for the transport of dangerous goods by sea. on land similar Dangerous Goods and Pollution legislation are also applied for safety of transporters and communities along the routes.   

In emergency special equipment and extra men may be required, they can slow loading/unloading down considerably. [Queues or backlogs cost more to clear.] [what risk assessment is given for incidents?]  

The small feeder has a capacity for 1,000 TEUs or less. A feeder ship can fit 1,000 to 2,000 TEUs. A Feedermax can carry a load of 2,000 to 3,000 containers. Feeders are the smallest type of container ship.
Panamax vessels are named after the canal that they were designed to sail through. Measuring 950 ft long and with a capacity of 4,000 – 5,000 TEU, or 65,000 – 80,000 tonnes (DWT); 

the Navios Unison, a 10,000 TEU, (super container ship)

the "ONE Innovation", the first of 24,000 TEU ]