Democracy and Election
DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims in Southern Thailand
By Dr. Suria Saniwa
ABSTRACT
This paper has examined the questions of “why ethnic minority strategies change from radical to moderate between 1993-1997?” and “how ethnic minority groups are represented in their respective parliamentary democratic system between 2002-2006?” It is written in a qualitative method. Thus, to explore it in depth, this paper provided its framework following Smith’s “ethnic revival” (1981) and Huntington’s “third wave” (1991). It has collected some data from documents counted as secondary data and the data interviewed from 60 Muslim movement leaders between 1993-1997 and 2002-2006 (fifty-fifty) are counted as primary ones. The moderation which has arisen in ethnic movement strategies may be caused by many factors. To see why ethnic strategies change from radical to moderate from our survey of 30 Thai Malay-Muslim movement leaders between 1993-1997: ‘democratization of a system,’ ‘better living standards,’ and ‘cultural exchanges’ are considered to be the chief factors that created a general environment which encouraged the ethnic Malay-Muslim movement to change its strategy towards moderation. Between 2002-2006, the perceptions of the other 30 Thai Malay-Muslim movement leaders interviewed on seven factors: ‘liberalization of a system,’ ‘globalization of communication,’ ‘styles of leadership,’ ‘knowledge of religion,’ ‘better standards of living,’ better education,’ and ‘attitude change’ are to discover a probable value which might be connected with the political representation of the Malay-Muslims. Between 1993-1997, we found that the factor of ‘democratization of a system’ is the most probable cause that changed the movement strategy from radical to moderate. And, between 2002-2006, the factor of better education was the most probable value that concerned the political representation of the Malay-Muslims, while the other six factors used in this paper, the study found that there were obvious differences in the perceptions of the respondents from the ethnic minority Malay-Muslim leaders studied. However, the strategy of ethnic representation of either radical or moderate inclinations is not dependent on better education, because both leaders from moderate and radical movements are well educated people. It is also found that the strategy of ethnic minority representation depends on the reactions by the dominant powers towards their ethnic minority groups. The Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand supported their moderate organization during a more liberalized Thai government but they turned to support their radical movements when the government used coercion to control the local people. We then suggested that the strategic responses from dominant powers towards their minority groups are very important. They can push and pull the strategies of ethnic minority groups to be radical or moderate.
DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims in Southern Thailand
By Dr. Suria Saniwa
This paper has examined two questions: “Why ethnic minority movement change from radical to moderate?” and “How ethnic minority groups are represented?” It begins by exploring some background of Thai democratization of the system, and followed by the roles of Al-Wahdah, results of the analyses, and the conclusion. The historic change in the dominant state policy occurred when Prime Minister assumed the post of premier in 1980. Prem pledged to strengthen democratization of the political party system, improve the bureaucracy, and develop local administration (Kamonwathin 1980:167). Thailand subsequently enjoyed prime minister who were elected in 1988 (Chatichai Choonhawan), 1992 (Chuan Leekpai), 1995 (Banharn Silpa-archa), 1996 (Chaovalit Yongchaiyut), 2001 (Thaksin Chinawat). Prime Minister Prem’s Order No. 66/23 pushed for open negotiations and democratic development as the best way to overcome the communist insurgency including the Thai Malay-Muslim guerillas, which had become widespread in the 1970s. Everyone was enjoined to develop their ability in self-defense, and play a role in political activities to solve the people’s problems (Anusarn Kotai 1983:30). The Policy of 66/25 identified more measures towards greater democratization of the system On 2 October 1981, General Harn Linanon, chief of the Fourth Region Armed Forces, declared the Tai Romyen (Save the South) Policy in support of the democratization of the system. It was a strategy to win the hearts and minds of the southern ethnic Malays and communists through the four duties which it enjoined all branches of government staff (civilians, police, and soldiers) to observe: -Create security to preserve the lives and properties of people without discrimination. All people must be safe from the threats of Thai communists, separatists, the Communist Party of Malaya in Thailand, and bandits. -Secure the area along the Thai-Malaysian border, develop the economy of the border provinces, and upgrade the relationship between Thailand and Malaysia. -Get rid of the powers of the dictators, bad behavior and underground activities; prevail upon the people with peaceful methods; and let people have freedom equality in politics, the economy, and society. -Create good relationships between official staff and commoners and dispose of discrimination between them absolutely (Anusarn Kotai 1983:30). According to Harn Linanon, the military could not guarantee the defeat of the revolutionary war because the activists were still surviving in the jungle and able to fight the government soldiers anytime. The surrender of the radical groups to the Army of the Second Region did not mean that they were defeated. They surrendered in order to effect a change in strategy following the Policy of 66/2523 to struggle for a perfect democratization of the system (Linanon 1981:19). The policy of Tai Romyen was to bring happiness and peace to reduce the power of radical movements and save the lives of the southern people through the beneficial program of the Yala-Based Administrative Center for the Southern Border Provinces (Anusarn Kontai 1983:30). The Yala-Based Administrative Center for Southern Border Provinces was founded on 11 May 1981 in compliance with the Order of the Thai cabinet on 16 December 1980 and the Order of the interior Department Vol. 156/1981. This center was to handle the administration of the southern border provinces (Yala Administrative Center 1994:78). It was to be directly administered by the Prime Minister’s office. The main objective of this Center was to solve the problems in the South and ensure national security in the southern border provinces following the cabinet decision of 8 November 1988. The Center was to coordinate all units concerned with the southern people, especially the Malay-Muslims. It was to facilitate government activities in the area and receive advice from the Muslim religious leaders in solving the religious conflicts in the South. The seven objectives of the Yala-Administrative Center were very important in solving problems in the southern part of Thailand. These were:
-To open up opportunities for the Malay-Muslims to learn the Thai language.
-To respect the cultural distinctiveness in the area.
-To accept the advice of the Malay-Muslim leaders in solving conflicts.
-To improve the role of government staff in the southernmost provinces.
-To cooperate with foreign countries to stop radical movements.
-To develop the economy and society in the region.
-To give special security to the southernmost provinces.
The Center provided briefings to newly arrived civil servants and held meetings between local Muslim leaders and Thai officials thereby developing communication lines between the administration and the Muslim populace. From 1981-1982, the Center caused the transfer of 72 civil servants for misfeasance (Anuragsa 1986:336).
The principle “communism defeats dictatorships but democratization of the system defeats the communists” (Donsathan and Thitiban 1987:24) proved successful during the tenure of Prime Minister Prem. The policy, Karnmuang nam karn taharn (politics to lead the military) was a strategic move to overcome the Communist Party of Thailand as well as Muslim mobilization against the Thai state. According to Army Chief General Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, there were three ways to secure Thailand: improve its control-center by reducing its size but making a bigger brain; perfect the democratization of the system; and spread the knowledge of liberal ideology to every group of people, including knowledge of the party political system.
Thai Malay-Muslim Moderate Organization. Al-Wahdah, its nature of representation and to what extent it addressed the concerns of Malay-Muslims. The Al-Wahdah organization is very important for our discussion in this paper. It is because all the movements from the ethnic Malay-Muslims in the southernmost provinces of Thailand are radical except the Al-Wahdah. Having this organization among the Malay-Muslims and gaining popular support from the people in the Muslim populated areas show that the Malay-Muslims prefer moderation to radicalization. However, it is unfortunate that the moderate movement was not fully supported by the government since 2004; this organization has been accused of masterminding the gun robbery from Thai military camps located in Yala and Narathiwat.
The Al-Wahdah has played a pivotal role in protecting Muslim interests in the southern provinces since the mid-1980s. It was founded by Malay-Muslim politicians and religious leaders from Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun at a conference in Majlis Agama Islam Patani (the Islamic Council of Pattani) on May 3, 1986 (Al-Wahdah News 1994:128), headed by Ustaz Sha-roning or Seni Madakakul, a former Member of Parliament from Narathiwat. Den Tohmeena (from Pattani province) and Wan Mohammad Nor Matha (from Yala province) also contributed to the establishment of Al-Wahdah. Al-Wahdah sought to achieve its objectives through working within the Thai system. Hence its main strategy was to secure ministerial positions in order to obtain power for the overall improvement of Muslim society. Leaders of Al-Wahdah contested as candidates for the elections in their attempt to be Members of Parliament or Cabinet Ministers. And politically, the Al-Wahdah leaders aligned themselves with the New Aspiration Party, headed by Chaovalit Yongchaiyut who shared the vision of improving and developing the south in a concerted effort to bring peace to the region. During the 1992 elections, members of Al-Wahdah won six parliamentary seats and two candidates were appointed ministers in the cabinet. They were Den Tohmeena who was appointed the Interior Deputy Minister and Wan Mohammad Nor Matha, who was appointed the Deputy President of Parliament. In the subsequent 1995 and 1996 elections, members of Al-Wahdah won five seats and Wan Mohammad Nor Matha was appointed the Minister of Communications and President of the Parliament. And the Al-Wahdah representation was strengthened with the senate appointments of Ustaz Nik Mukhtar Waba (Pattani) and Aziz bin Hawan (Yala), members of Al-Wahdah from Pattani and Yala, in March 1996 (Matichon 3 April 1996). The strategy of working within the system, worked positively for the Malay-Muslims. Members of Al-Wahdah were able to set up the Koperasi Islam Patani, an Islamic-based cooperative banking system, advocate the correct Islamic way of life, namely in the use of Islamic names, and the opportunity to build a hospital named after the revered leader, Tuan Haji Sulong, the first Islamic private hospital in Pattani province in 1996 (Interview with Azman Tohmena, Al-Wahdah member, in Pattani 20 August 2002). Basically the Al-Wahdah had a two-prong policy addressing two pertinent issues; firstly, economic, and secondly, social that includes Islamic affairs encompassing education and religion (Al-Wahdah News 1994:133-9). Let us look at them in turn. With regard to economic policy, in order to improve the living standard of the southern provinces, the Al-Wahdah worked with the New Aspiration Party to produce a policy of agriculture to protect the local agricultural products and highway projects starting from Sungai Golak (southern Thailand) to northern Thailand to attract tourists into the areas. In line with this policy, the budget for the irrigation system and the highway projects for the Muslim populated southernmost provinces was increased. Considerable funds for the irrigation projects were released into local administrative village centers. As a result of this policy, Taluban Municipality in Pattani built a river barrage that was completed in 2003, and the highways as a direct route from Narathiwat in southern Thailand to Chiangmai in northern Thailand was completed in 2002. Furthermore, this policy also made allocations to protect and encourage the interests of small boat fishermen, a provision for the setting up of an Islamic banking system, and a provision of incentives for the agricultural sector, especially the local Malay-Muslims. Thus, along the sea coasts in Pattani and Narathiwat provinces were planted with pakarang tiam (artifical corals) to fertilize fishes in the sea to help the local small boat fishermen. Furthermore, Islamic banking system was launched officially in Thailand by the government in 2002.
With regard to education, religion and social policies, Al-Wahdah urged for an open policy to encourage the education and religion of Malay-Muslims is accordance with Articles No. 4, 5, and 25 of the Thai Constitution of 1978, which are to protect ethnic minority groups, their religion, their culture, and their rights. This policy must also be in line with the administration of the State of Patani, provided for in the Constitution of King Rama VI in 1923, which was to take care of the Malay-Muslims for having their standard and political right better than the Malays in Malaysia (Chitmuad 1991:207). It may be for this reason that the Muslims in the reign of King Rama VI and in the 1990s, during Al-Wahdah’s time (see also Table 1) did not resist the government. Since 1992, with the participation of Al-Wahdah in the New Aspiration Party, Muslim representation was made possible. This strategic alliance has borne fruit as can be seen from the cabinet appointments in Table 1 below:
TABLE 1: Positions of Al-Wahdah Leaders in the Ministerial Cabinet
| Year | Names of Al-Wahdah Leaders | Ministerial Positions | Periods |
| 1992 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 2001 2002 2004 2004 2005 | Den Tohmeena (Pattani) Wan Mohammad Nor Matha (Yala) Wan Mohammad Nor Matha Wan Mohammad Nor Matha Wan Mohammad Nor Matha Aripen Utrasin (Narathiwat) Wan Mohammad Nor Matha Wan Mohammad Nor Matha Wan Mohammad Nor Matha Wan Mohammad Nor Matha Wan Mohammad Nor Matha | Deputy Minister of Interior Deputy President of the Parliament Deputy Minister of Interior Minister of Transport and Communications President of the Parliament Deputy Minister of Education Minister of Transport and Communications Interior Minister Deputy Prime Minister Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives Advisor to the Prime Minister | 2 years 2 Years 8 months 2 years 3 years 4 months 1 year 1 year 3 months 3 months 1 year |
Source: The Data are compiled from Al-Wahdah News (1994); Pojjanaworawong, & Pojjanaworawong (1999); and Bangkok Post (25-27 October 2004).
These ministerial positions have empowered the Muslim political leaders and have become a source of pride to the Muslim community. In fact, the tactical alliance has been instrumental in appeasing the needs of the Malay-Muslims within the Thai political system. In addition, regarding the ministerial appointments for Malay-Muslims, Chaovalit, leader of New Aspiration Party from Bangkok, was reported to have said, “the positions that we gave to the Malay-Muslims was not because of quota or any rate of the Thai region. But, they (the ministerial positions) are for the Muslims to solve their problems. The problem is that the Muslims were treated brutally by dictators in the past periods” (Muslim News June 2001:22). One could infer that Chaovalit had the foresight to include the aspirations of the Malay-Muslims. Thus, the attempts of improving and solving national problems were made possible after Al-Wahdah joined the New Aspiration Party. In terms of religion, the Al-Wahdah in 1993, proposed a draft that encompassed the following: firstly, to enable Muslim women to don the hijab in their identity cards and in public; secondly, to correct the spelling of Muslim names to be in accordance with Arabic; thirdly, to award financial remuneration to Islamic religious leaders and teachers, and finally, to implement complementary services for the Haj pilgrimage for Muslims at Don Muang, Haad Yai, and Phuket airports (From Agreement To Creation 1995-1996:71-91). In response to the proposals, two important provisions were successfully drafted: the provision for the wearing of Hijab (head-dress for Muslim ladies) in public and in their identity cards.
Where the final recommendation is concerned, Wan Mohammad Nor Matha, the Minister of Communications undertook the responsibility of building more multiple-purpose buildings at Haad Yai and Phuket airports for Haj travelers. He was also instrumental in obtaining the first direct Thai flights from Thailand to Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), the provision of sign-boards showing the locations of mosques along the highways, as well as the construction of Four-Lane-Super Highway routes from Sungai Golok in Narathiwat through Pattani and Songkhla up to northern Thailand. It should be noted that he was in 2004 the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives. It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Al-Wahdah in the government resulted in many developmental projects being focused in Malay-Muslim areas. The strategy of being a political party that seeks to represent Malay-Muslims in the government by working within the system can be considered a fruitful one. But this strategy also involved a garnering of support from the non-governmental organizations or NGOs. This is because as Table 1 would reveal the Al-Wahdah representation in Cabinet was rather small. Hence, many of the developments were made possible with the support that it has garnered from non-governmental organizations as well. For instance, the February 2000 senatorial elections saw the victory of only three Malay-Muslim leaders, and yet the provisions for the hijab for females in government institutions and in the identity cards was passed at the third reading in the parliament. This may be attributed to the NGOs’ support (Interview with Nik Mukhtar Waba, Senator from Pattani province in Saiburi on 20 October 2003). In 2000, with the growing awareness of Islam, Al-Wahdah, with the support of Chaovalit Yongchaiyut, and the Deputy Minister of Education, Aripen Utrasin, proposed certain reforms to the Permanent Undersecretary of Education Minister (Muslim News November 2000:18). The first was the setting up of the Committee of Correcting Regulations on School Uniforms that would allow school children to wear school uniforms that are in line with Islamic laws; secondly, to provide for a Muslim prayer room or hall in government schools and government offices where the total number of Muslim students or the Muslim staff studying or working was more than 100 (Muslim News November 2000:20). In terms of education for Malay youths in southern Thailand, Al-Wahdah has worked continuously to this end. Central to this is Al-Wahdah’s policy of improving the Tadika or Muslim Kindergartens. Since 1992, a budget of more than 20 million Baht has been allocated for the Tadika. The size of the budget reflects the seriousness of Al-Wahdah in their attempt to inculcate Muslims with the teachings of Islam. And Al-Wahdah also believed that the Tadika is the backbone of religion and crucial for the preservation of Malay identity and culture (Interview with Muk Sulaiman, the representative of Pattani province, in Pattani on 18 October 2003). Despite its importance, there were problems arising from the fact that the teachers and administrators running the Tadika did not receive any remuneration from the government. In the election campaign of January 2001, there was a rejuvenation in the interest on the development of the Malay-Muslim Tadikas. In the Al-Wahdah campaign, an increased budget of 920 million Baht (US$ 23 million) was requested for the development of Tadikas. However, this amount is only 10 per cent of what the state had to spend for religious patronages compared to the total national allocation. The Al-Wahdah believed that the Tadika must be nurtured not marginalized as it is an important symbol for the existence of the Malay-Muslim community (Muslim News November 2000:13). Thus, we can see that in the 2001 election campaign of Al-Wahdah, three strategies were forwarded to solve the problems of the Tadika. The first was the call for an allocation of ten percent of the 2001 budget for religious projects. The reason for this is that according to the National Constitution of Thailand, a budget of 9,200 million Baht or US$230 million is allocated for educational development together with morality; and 10 per cent of the religious budget amounts to 920 million Baht (US$ 23 million). This is a very large sum when compared to the previous year’s budget for Islamic religion which was only 25 million Baht (US$ 0.5 million). Thus, the recommended amount of 920 million Baht could be used to pay the salaries of Tadika teachers, Imam (religious leaders in a mosque), Khateb (religious leaders who give Friday sermons), and bilal (religious leaders who call for prayer) (Muslim News November 2000:15). The second is to consider the annual budget allocated to the Religious Department. This budget, the krongkarn songserm karnriean karnsorn phuthasasana naiwan yud or the project of enhancing Buddhist education during holidays. The state pays a total of 150 baht (US$ 4) per hour to Buddhist monks for religious teachings. During the tenure of Aripen Utrasin as the Deputy Minister of Education, this budget was made available for Islamic religious purposes amounting to 30 million baht (US$ 0.75 million) (Interview with Aripen Utrasin, the representative of Narathiwat province, in Pattani on 22 May 2003). A third strategy is the decentralization of the budget allocated to both the Village and Provincial Administrative Centers. Each Provincial Administrative Center is allocated 10 million baht, per member of Parliament. Hence Yala province that had three MPs would receive an allocation of 300 million Baht (US$ 7.5 million). Pattani and Narathiwat provinces which had four MPs will receive 400 million Baht (US$ 10.0 million) per province. All the three strategies advocated by the Al-Wahdah can be seen as an attempt to develop the Tadika as the foundation of education for Malay youths. This reflects the growing awareness of the importance of Islam in the southern region and their rather moderate approach to the religion. In terms of championing the struggle and the needs of the people, Muk Sulaiman an Al-Wahdah member, in his election speech stated:
we are struggling for the survival of Islamic affairs for the people, the same as what PAS political party in Malaysia is doing, Nik Aziz (Malaysian PAS leader) said to me that as long as we honestly struggle for Islam, we can win even though we face ten strong leaders like Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, who is struggling for the survival of his cronies (Interview with Muk Sulaiman, the representative of Pattani province, in Pattani on 18 October 2003).
It can be seen that the Muslim organizations do not exist in isolation in Thailand or elsewhere. In general, there is a certain degree of co-operation and networking with similar organizations overseas. For example, during the 100th parliament union conference about civilizations and cultures that was held in Amman between April 29 to May 9, 2001, Thailand sent Faisal Yingsaman, an Al-Wahdah member as its representative.
In his speech, Faisal focused on the importance of living in harmony and he said:
…the view…. of different civilizations and cultures is very important for this century. …People in Thailand who embrace Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, or other religions live peacefully. We have our constitution of Thai kingdom to forbid anyone who insults others that have different beliefs in their hearts, different generations, different languages, and different religions. We have learned to understand the different ones and accept discussion of different cultures which guides to make peace in a society… as we are living in a new century of globalization and a progress of technology, we should have a positive thinking towards the differences to enhance our cooperation and to utilize these different cultures, communities, and economics for a new knowledge of communications including the internet to combat political conflicts…. I will be fully supportive of the cultures, education, and societies in regional and international levels to preserve the different cultures and civilizations. Finally, I am also supportive of the United Nations in declaring the year of 2000 to be the year of negotiations between different cultures of the United Nations. I believe that the beginning of this conference will help the processes of peace and civilization forever (Muslim News June 2001:24). Al-Wahdah is now known internationally and this has paved the way for assistance from overseas. For example, the Al-Azhar University of Egypt has awarded scholarships through the Al-Wahdah, to deserving Thai Muslim students. The scholarship selection process is usually done through the Yala branch of the New Aspiration Party. And, it was also revealed that Iraq, during the tenure of President Saddam Hussein had offered four scholarships for the Thai Muslims. The successful students who passed the selection examination traveled to study in Iraq on 15 June 2000 (Muslim News June 2001:25). Furthermore, between June and August 2000, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) offered many scholarships for the Muslims who wished to pursue basic degrees in accountancy, finance, business, economics, medicine, nursing, pharmacy, dentistry, engineering, agriculture, fishery and others. The feeling of the Malay-Muslims towards the government at this time appeared positive. Many Malay-Muslims’ students, including those from Saiburi district continued their education overseas. The number of students from Saiburi district (Pattani province) alone who studied in Saudi Arabia and in other Middle East countries totaled more than 20 students (Interview with Hassan Nikmatullah, Imam of Taluban Mosque, in Saiburi district (Pattani province) on 18 May 2003). Furthermore, the government policy known as nueng amphur nueng thun or ‘one district one scholarship’ was also able to support students with scholarships from these four southern provinces to go abroad to study management in Malaysia, biomedicine in China, public health in Canada, and pharmacy in Spain (Interview with Nurihan, a scholarship student, in Saiburi district on 10 March 2004). The pragmatic leadership and the moderate attitude reflected by members and leaders of Al-Wahdah have been instrumental in garnering the support needed from within as well as outside the country in their quest to better the lives of the Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand. Although Al-Wahdah and its members have tried to struggle to protect the Muslims’ interests, it was productive only at the time when there was democracy; such as during the Chuan Leekphai’s government (September 1992-July 1995), the Banharn Silpa-archa’s (July 1995-November 1996), Chaovalit Yongchaiyut’s (November 1996-Novemeber 1997), and the first term of Thaksin Shinnawat’s (1999-2003) (Pojjanaworawong & Pojjanaworawong 1999:167). The position of Al-Wahdah was awkward in the second term of Thasksin’s government since its members were accused of gun robbery from the army camps in Narathiwat and Yala provinces.
Unfortunately, however, relations between Thaksin’s government and Al-Wahdah members sourced in 2004 after two incidents of gun-robberies from the army camps in Narathiwat and Yala. The Al-Wahdah members were accused of masterminding these incidents. Many local people disappeared or killed at Geriseh Mosque in Pattani and at Tak Bai police station in Narathiwat in April 2004 and October 2004. To control the unrest in the areas, Thaksin declared an emergency that made it possible for the police and soldiers to arrest the local people without approval from courts. Support for moderate representation took a turn for the worse in the aftermath of the Tak Bai bloodbath of 2004. The Malay-Muslims who had been supportive of moderate movement began to lend their support to radicalization. The incident took place during the first office of Prime Minister Thaksin, who had inadvertently replaced the 66/23 policy of ‘the politics to lead the military,’ to that of ‘the military to lead the politics.’ It is believed that such unrests could be due to the fact that the policy implemented by Prime Minister Thaksin towards the Malay-Muslims was discriminatory. In February and March 2004, the government sent the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Chaturon Chaisaeng, to the South on a mission to procure resolution of peace directly from the southern Malay-Muslims. This resolution, which was presented by Chaturon Chaisaeng, indicated the need to reconsider the administration in the area as an autonomous zone but it was rejected by Thaksin’s office (Interview with Al-Wahdah member, Ustaz Mahmood, in Pattani on 18 October 2004).
Results of the Analyses. This paper has examined “why ethnic minority strategies change from radical to moderate between 1993-1997?” and “how ethnic minority groups are represented in their respective parliamentary democratic system between 2002-2006?” We have divided our surveys asking 30 Thai Malay-Muslim leaders into two periods: between 1993-1997 and between 2002-2006. Between 1993-1997, we found that the ethnic Malay-Muslim movement leaders were satisfied with the changes in the Thai political system.
More than ninety per cent of the ethnic Malay-Muslim movement leaders admitted that the factor of democratization of the Thai system encouraged the change of the ethnic movement strategy towards moderation. Thus, the democratization of the system became the major probable cause which has influenced the ethnic Malay-Muslim movement to change its strategy towards moderation. Regarding better living standards, all the ethnic Malay-Muslim movement leaders admitted that the living standards of the Malay-Muslims are better compared to the last 25 years ago. Sixty per cent admitted that the better living standards have also strengthened their political status. There is some evidence indicating the moderating effect of better living standards on the movement’s leaders, although the effect on the Malay-Muslim masses remains unclear. Thus the factor of better living standards is also a probable cause in influencing the ethnic Malay movement leaders to change their strategy towards moderation. And the final factor found between 1993-1997 is that, the increased tolerance shown by the government towards the Malay-Muslims is also an important one making for moderation. The policy of Tai Romyen was especially launched to solve the misunderstanding between bureaucrats and the ethnic Malay-Muslims in the Muslim populated area. Article No. 4 of the Tai Romyen states: “Create good relationships between official staff and commoners, and dispose of discrimination between them absolutely”. Then bureaucrats who threatened the Muslims in the region were removed from the Muslim area. The ethnic Malay-Muslims took part in helping the government to solve the conflict in the region. And the regulations of government officials were adjusted to be more in line with the Muslims culture. Relations between the Thai Buddhists and the ethnic Malay-Muslims improved. Hundred per cent of the ethnic movement leaders admitted that they live more peacefully in the society. And 53.3 per cent believed that the cultural exchanges have encouraged the ethnic Malay-Muslims to change their strategy towards moderation.
Between 2002-2006, it has been found that the Malay-Muslims exercised their rights by voting for their leaders to represent their groups in dominant political parties with a hope of developing their societies. The findings have also shown that the ethnic group could see that education is the key for improvement.
Better education also has the most important role in political representation, we found that seventy per cent of the Malay-Muslim leaders agree, twenty per cent do not give their perceptions, and ten per cent disagree with it.
However, it is not conclusive whether better education can be the factor that determines their inclination towards radicalization or moderation, but it is undeniable that better education is an asset to mankind. The ethnic Malay-Muslims utilize both radical and moderate movements to selecting minority representatives into achieve their political goals. This is so because the responses of dominant powers are not in line with what the local people need. The general election method for members of parliament does not work in the Malay-Muslim areas without a free election for governors. Furthermore, the Thai government sometimes employs forced policies to control and suppress the people instead of employing a policy of cooperation by selecting ethnic minority representatives following the percentage of their rates (PR) into the Upper House or the Cabinet to advise the government in making policies. Conclusion In southern Thailand, Al-Wahdah has considerable success in political representation within the system, while the radical movements such as Bersatu represented the Malay-Muslim communities in a radical form. Al-Wahdah was demanding for an improvement of Tadika (Islamic kindergarten schools) as its base to gain its support from the local Malay-Muslims. In addition, it was also demanding for more development projects in the Muslim areas. On the contrary, Bersatu was demanding for an independent Patani state. Thus, at the time when Al-Wahdah initiatives were being accepted by the government, it is evident that the degree of support by the Malay-Muslims for moderate political representation was higher than for radicalized movements. It is noted that unrests did not occur between 1986-1998, when Al-Wahdah was largely accepted. Interestingly, the degree of unrest heightened after the Al-Wahdah was accused of involvement in the gun-robbery incidents. Since then, Bersatu is a
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