CHAPTER II THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE IN THERAVĀDA BUDDHISM.
2.1. THE CONDITIONS OF REALITY
2.1.1 Introduction
Buddhism is a way of life, and in the ultimate sense of the term, it cannot be called religion which is concerned with the belief in God. Normally, Buddhists speak of Buddhism as Buddhasāsana or Buddha-Dhamma meaning the Buddha’s teachings. However, by common usage of language, the Buddhists may be allowed to call Buddhism as a religion, because they do believe in the moral law of karma.85 On the other hand, though the Buddha preached the doctrine of karma, he could be called a kiriyavādin, Howsoever his teachings are far more than a mere notion of the karma-doctrine. He was criticized as a revolutionist because of his replacing Ātmavāda and self-mortification with Anattāvāda and the Middle Way respectively. Likewise, by the rejection of the caste-system and also of the idea of God he was reckoned as a reformist. By discovering the Four Noble Truths, he is known as a reconstructionist.
The philosophy of Buddhism is chiefly psychological, and its ethics cannot be entirely separated from its metaphysics. The ultimate purpose of all its philosophy is not intellectual but moral – the attainment of freedom from the suffering or Nibbāna (Skt. Nirvāna) which is the Buddhist Summum Bonum.
We are told in the Pitaka that the Buddha took no interest in purely metaphysical questions, because they appeared to be questions without profit, and a mere waste of time. Even in his most abstruse teachings his purpose is ethical.
The Buddha avoided discussion about purely metaphysical questions, such as whether the world is eternal or not, and so on, which are regarded as vain, for it does not take man nearer to his goal. The world of the Buddha was that of the six-feet-long-living body along with perceptions and thoughts, where the root-cause of suffering and samsāra, namely, avijjā, can be uprooted. Therefore we can say that Buddhism does not agree with the speculative metaphysics. In Buddhist philosophy, the metaphysical doctrine must relate to the ethical goal of life as the Middle Way (majjhimā-patipadā).
The Buddhist idea of existence or the metaphysical doctrine, it is said, can be viewed under the highest forms of explanation, viz., the five khandhas, the eighteen dhātus and the six āyatanas, in the light of the Four Noble Truths. In this way, the Buddha divided truth into two kinds, apparent (sammuttisacca) and ultimate (paramatthasacca) . The latter is actually emphasized by the Buddha. The world of human beings, and its existence, for instance, do not really exist as we apparently perceive them. They are naturally described as “the conditioned existence’ (sańkhata), which can be explained in terms of five khandhas, namely, matter (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), mental formations (sańkhāra) and consciousness (viññāna). These five constituents are also called nāma-rūpa. According to Abhidhamma, rūpa signifies fundamental unit of matter, material changes, and the twenty-eight derivative materials which originate from four conditions, viz., “karma”, “citta”, “nutriment” and “temperature”. Nāma refers to consciousness (citta) and its mental concomitants (cetasikas).
In the realization of existence, we will begin with the analysis of the five khandhas as the reality, which represents “life as it is”, but it is not complete in itself, for as usual we are dealing with “life as directly concerning world”. Therefore, the analysis of āyatanas has been made with a view to show the world-related life, especially by means of perceiving the world through six sense doors. Here the phenomenal existence can be explained in terms of the six sense-organs and their six sense-objects, the function of which is to develop perceptual awareness. Not only this, it also evolves as a whole in the phenomenal world (samsāra). We must remember that the five khandhas and the twelve āyatanas never function in isolation in the way we have described. But we have discuss them in isolating one from the other in order to comprehend their relative positions that constitute personality.
The Abhidhammikas classify the ultimate truth into citta, cetasika, rūpa and Nibbāna and admit that the first three do ‘conditionally exist’ (sańkhata), but the last one ‘unconditionally exist’ (asańkhata). Therefore, the Theravāda Buddhist philosophy is known as realism as it upholds the existence of the ultimate truths. In this connection, the Sarvāstivāda, the Vaibhāsikas, the Sautrāntikas and the Puggalavāda on beings have been elaborately and separately brought out in comparison with the other schools of thought. It should be mentioned here that no Buddhist school admits the definite assertible self, as it would go against the fundamental teachings of the Buddha. The Puggalavādins’ conception of self is, therefore, neither definite nor indefinite self.
The idea of existence classified in terms of khandhas, dhātus and āyatanas as mentioned above, can be well understood only through the causal law of existence, especially the law of Tilakkhana and that of Paticcasamuppāda, which completely explain the exact way in which the personality is evolved and disintergrated. The law of Tilakkhana helps to explain the nature of conditioned things in the light of impermanence, suffering and not-self. The basis of debate between the Buddhists and Hindus is the concept of self.86 If the causal law of nature is understood in its proper perspective, there will hardly be any scope for further confusion in this matter. According to the causal law of nature, the effect arises from an aggregate of causes and conditions. Because of ignorance arise consciousness, karma-formation, and so on.
2.1.2 Buddhist Concept of Human Existence
Buddhism regards the human being as superior to all the other species. The human being is entirely different from other animals in respect of mentality which is somewhat complicated. It is like dense forest that has no entrance and is difficult to penetrate, in comparison with the nature of an animal, which is much easier to understand.87 The Buddha realized that man, while being tempted to perform evil actions, could be properly directed towards the performance of good actions (kusalakamma). According to Buddhism, there are three ‘immoral roots’ (akusalamūla), namely, lust (lobha), hatred (dosa) and delusion (moha), which are regarded as the original cause of ignorance (avijjā).88 It is, therefore, said that the real nature of an ordinary man is always entangled with the impurities (kilesas) and worldly pleasures and he is always guided by ignorance. In the Dhammapada, the Buddha said : “Oh ! wise man, it is true that not easy to control are evil things, do not let greed and weakness drag you to prolonged suffering.”89
When asked, “What is the true idea of human existence in Buddhism ?” the most apt reply is that human existence is ‘a psycho-physical complex’ (nāma-rūpa) conditioned and determined by what is called an antecedent state in the process of ‘becoming’ (bhava) in which both action (karma) and reaction (karmaphala) play an essential part in the development of personality. On the other hand, man as perceived from within and without, is analysed into a collection of ‘five aggregates’ (pañcakkhandha) of changing elements, namely, the group of his looks (rūpa), sentiments (vedanā), perceptional outfit (saññā), mental pre-dispositions (sańkhāra), and acts of consciousness (viññāna) such as remembering, thinking and so on.90 The first group is called ‘matter’ (rūpa), as named earlier, but the last four are together termed ‘mind’ (nāma), and they are collectively called nāma-rūpa.91 The analysis of human existence into nāma-rūpa and five khandhas is found both in the Nikāyas and the Abhidhamma.92 In the Khuddaka-Nikāya, the word nāmakāya is used synonymously with nāma-rūpa,93 which is the abbreviated form of the five khandhas. It is to be noted that the Abhidhamma admits the ‘Four Ultimate Realities’ (paramattha-dhamma), namely, citta (consciousness), cetasika (mental factors), rūpa (matter), and Nibbāna. It is said, the five khandhas can be matched with the Four Ultimate Realities as follows : Rūpa is called rūpa, viññāna is called citta, and the rest are included in cetasikas. But Nirvāna cannot be grouped as it is ‘free from the five khandhas’, hence it is called khandha-vinimutta.94
There is another classification of the element of human existence, which is divided into two groups of cognitive faculties and of the different categories of the objects. The two groups are called ‘based’ (āyatanas), which are of twelve kinds in number, divided into six cognitive faculties known as ‘six internal bases’ (ajjhattikāyatanas) and six categories of corresponding objects known as ‘six external bases’ (bahirāyatanas). The internal bases are also regarded as receptive faculties called indriya and the external ones are objects called visaya. These twelve bases, both internal and external, are sufficient for the formulation of the idea of man. They work for the purpose of developing a consciousness and evolve the being as a whole in the phenomenal world or samsāra. In order to grasp the concept of man more easily, the classification of man in accordance with eighteen elements (dhātus) comes into existence.95 Besides the twelve bases and the eighteen elements, Buddhism also admits the classification of man into twenty-two indriyas96 into six elements.97
It is essential to note that the idea of human existence consisting of the five khandhas and twelve āyatanas is common to all schools of Buddhism. These khandhas and āyatanas are generally possessed by all, not only human beings but also animals and gods alike, because, according to Buddhism, man can be born as a god or an animal and vice versa, along with his karma accumulated in the human world. The example of this fact can be considered from the Jātakas, which narrate about the birth stories of the Bodhisatta. This indicates that Buddhism regards man as evolving out of man due to the previous karma, since Buddhism considers all perceived things as conditional things (sańkhāra) and thus the objective world is considered the same as the experienced world. In the process of analysis, the principles which explain the nature of the world and the character of man’s existence are reduced to the twelve āyatanas and five khandhas respectively. Following this, the problems of the world and soul can actually be taken into account as that of matter and mind, and ultimately the world and man are considered as one and the same. That is, the Buddha had a method of instruction based on a division of the world, conventionally called twelve āyatanas, into a material aspect (rūpa) and non-material aspect (nāma), and counting both aspects together makes a total of five components (pañcakkhandhas), which constitute the external world in general and the internal world or man in particular.
According to the Buddha, good and evil are to be considered as two aspects of human nature, and man usually performs either wholesome and unwholesome karmas, because of the conflict of the two aspects as already mentioned. Hence in the Ańguttara-Nikāya,98 the Buddha classifies human beings into four kinds : (1) Some come from darkness, but will only go to darkness, (ii) Some come from darkness, but will go to light, (iii) Some come from light, but will go to darkness, (iv) Some come from light and they will go to light. The last one is appreciated by the Buddha as it signifies one of not only noble birth, but also of good conduct. Such a person will never suffer in this life and in the life to come. In support of doing good, avoiding evil and purifying one’s mind,99 the Buddha preached the Middle Path as the criterion of the best man. “The tamed is the best among men - danto settho manussesu.”100 The best man in Buddhism is identified by these five characteristics, namely, being not credulous, knowing the uncreated, having severed all ties, having put an end to opportunity and having removed all desires. The first is that the best man ascertains everything before believing. Secondly, he knows Nirvāna. Thirdly, he destroys samsāra. Fourthly, he has no chance to do both good and evil. Finally, he has no defilements to hope for anything.101 If one conquers just oneself, one is, indeed, the greatest victor.102 The Buddha with his clear insight understands the human nature and the conduct leading to be a perfect man. In short, man is defined by his actions – what he did, what he is doing, and what he will do ; so his nature is conditioned by karma.
2.1.3 The Human Existence in the Light of the Four Noble Truths
Strictly speaking, the correct Buddhist position with regard to the existence of man is based on the understanding of the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths, the main contents of which are about the idea of man. Actually, there are two domains of Dharma enlightened by the Buddha, of which one is the law of Paticcasamuppāda, which includes the doctrines of karma and Nirvāna, and the other one is the Four Noble Truths. These two doctrines are essentially one and the same, because the law of Paticcasamuppāda and Nirvāna are really the essence of Four Noble Truths. But they are regarded as pure teachings or natural elements, while the Four Noble Truths refer to all enlightened Dharmas, which appear in the light of the ordered process with regard to the capacity of man’s understanding and making use of.103 Just as the foot of every creature that walks the earth will go into the elephant’s footprint, … so are all right states of mind said to be included in the Four Noble Truths.104 The doctrine of the Four Noble Truths is, therefore, the essence as well as the destiny of man. The Buddha addressed his disciples at the Simsapa grove regarding the Four Noble Truths that he had taught them by comparing them to the leaves in his hand, while the remaining Dharmas that he had known but did not teach them, are like the leaves in the whole forest, because those Dharmas are not conductive to the termination of suffering.105
In the first sermon, the significance of the Four Noble Truths was made known by the Buddha.106 The Noble Truths are so-called because they dealt with reality and are realized by only the Noble Ones such as the Buddha. These truths will lead us only to the highest wisdom.107 They constitute a progressive series, that is, each truth leads up to the next. The failure to understand these truths will result in long wandering in samsāra for all creatures.108 The Buddha himself exhorted his disciples to put forth their special desire, effort and attention for the understanding of these truths.109 It is mentioned in the Samyutta-Nikāya that one can develop one’s spirituality by telling and hearing the Four Noble Truths among good friends (kalyānamitta).110
The explanation of man according to the Four Noble Truths should be brought into consideration here. Among the Four Noble Truths, the first truth called suffering is the nucleus around which the remaining truths assemble. The first truth implies all the problems of life comprising birth, old age, disease, despair and so on. In short, anything that exists, including the five khandhas and twelve āyatanas, is suffering. Buddhism regards the five khandhas themselves as suffering. They are like a burden : it means that life is a burden. To be is to suffer and the way out would consist in going out of existence. Suffering is thus the essence as well as the destiny of man. The most important factor of the miserable condition is inherent impermanence (anicca) of man and things. When the existence is impermanent, then there is nothing called permanent soul or self, there is only becoming (bhava). It is said that this replacement of the Upanisadic idea of Being by that of Becoming and the view of the universe as uninterrupted and ununified stream of momentary particulars is the distinct contribution of Buddhism to Indian thought.111 The second truth affirms that there is a cause of suffering called ignorance (avijjā) that makes man cling to the sense of his ego and through it to the world by not knowing things as they really are. This truth includes the law of cause and effect (paticcasamuppāda) and the immutable law of karma and rebirth. And by stopping the operation of the cause of suffering, it is possible, as affirmed by the third truth, to uproot suffering. This truth indicates the law of Paticcasamuppāda in the aspect of the Dependent Cessation, otherwise called Nirvana. The fourth truth delineates the method one has to adopt in order to achieve complete freedom from suffering. When ignorance is uprooted, one becomes a perfect man or Arahant. This truth suggests the way of life called the Middle Way (Majjhimapatipadā), comprising the eight constituent of the Noble Path. And they are further organized into the ‘Threefold Training’ (tisikkhā) as a short practical way.
2.1.4 The Analysis of the Five Khandhas as Life Really is
First of all, in this connection the term “khandhas” (Skt. Skhandhas) means “groups” (of existence) or ‘groups of clinging’ (upadānakkhandha) ; its alternative renderings are “aggregates”, “categories of objects of clinging,” that constitute man’s personality.112 According to T.W. Rhys Davids, the word “khandhas” means : “The elements or substrata of sensory existence, sensorial aggregates which condition the appearance of life in any form. Their character according to quality and value of life and body is evanescent, fraught with ills and leading to rebirth.”113
Buddhism regards man’s life in its reality as composed of the groups of the constituents, say, “five aggregates” (pañcakkhandhas) : “When certain things of their various parts combined, we speak of ‘chariot’ or ‘car’, just so when these five khandhas are there, we use the designation ‘man’ or ‘being’.114 And the five groups of being elucidated in the Buddhist scriptures are thus :
Whatever there are of corporeal things, whether past, present or future, one’s own or external, gross or subtle, lofty or low, far or near, all that belongs to the corporeality group : The same argument is repeated for the other four groups of being, such as feeling, perception, mental formation and consciousness-groups.115
These are the five aspects which appear to the untrained or ignorant man as his “permanent soul” or “self” (atta).
It is said that the analysis of the five khandhas serves as the detailed illustration of the nature of the five-fold primary analysis of a being. Hence, the purpose of analysis mentioned in the Vibhańga of the Abhidhamma deserves to be quoted here:
It is to show to those who may accept the idea of the existence of a soul or spirit as a constituent part of a being that such a concept is unnecessary to the understanding of the structural nature of beings. Whatever may be observed or formulated from the behaviour of beings, either in general or in particular, is classified under one or other of the five aggregates.116
Generally speaking, the purpose of analysis is to enrich the understanding of man about what he is not, technically called Anatta. As Nyanatiloka puts it thus :
“What is called individual existence is in reality nothing but a mere process of those mental and physical phenomena, a process that since time immemorial has been going on, and that also after death will still continue for unthinkably long periods of time. These five groups, however, neither singly nor collectively constitute any self-dependent real ego-entity, or personality (atta), nor is there to be found any such entity apart from them. Hence the belief in such an ego-entity or personality, as real in the ultimate sense, proves a mere illusion”.117
The five khandhas, when examined carefully, appear empty just like the bubbles on the Ganges. To quote the similar parables: “The body is like a lump of foam, the feelings like a water-bubble, perception like a void mirage, mental formations like a plantain-tree and consciousness like jugglery.”118 It is said that the human personality is comparable to the sound of a Vīnā, a music instrument. By the combination of its various parts there is sound, the music cannot be found by breaking up the Vīnā into small pieces and finally by burning it because the music is unreal and impermanent unity. It is like a man who has nothing to identify oneself with the five khandhas even by investigating them thoroughly.119
The same connotation of the five khandhas is said to have been explained by the Buddha both in the Majjhima-Nikāya120 and in the Samyutta-Nikāya121 to a certain monk who asked many questions regarding the nature of the five khandhas, already mentioned earlier. The emphasis on it here is that the khandhas remain as long as the knowledge of their true character is not attained ; “with right insight one can understand things as they really are.”122 Their contemplation leads to the recognition of their character as impermanence, suffering and no-self.123 Having understood the relative existence of the five khandhas, there will be no idea of eternalism (sassata-ditthi) and annihilationism (ucchedaditthi). A man who knows how to analyse the constituent of life will contribute to his training of analytical thought. He will essentially see various things as their reality in the aspect of objective (sabhāva-visaya), not of subjective (saka-visaya). Because in ultimate analysis all things are sankhara (conditioned things). He knows correctly the conditioned as conditioned. In Buddhism the personality factors are conditioned processes (paticcasamuppāda kho pan’ime yadidam pancuppādānakkhandha).124
It may be noted here that the five khandhas are just classificatory groupings; they should not be conceived as compact entities (heaps or bundles), for actually only single representative of these groups, mostly variable, can arise with any state of consciousness. The five khandhas are frequently mentioned with the eighteen dhātus and twelve āyatanas.125 Our discussion here will thus be mainly based on the khandha-vagga and the salāyatana-vagga of the Samyutta-Nikāya, the Mahāhatthipadopama-Sutta and the Mahārāhulovāda-Sutta of the Majjhima-Nikāya, the Dhammasańganī and Vibhańga of the Abhidhamma, the Visuddhimagga and the Abhidhammattha-sańgaha,126 since the psycho-physical analysis of man was not yet systematized in early scriptures. It was owing to the endeavours of the Abhidhamma teachers that various aspects of human existence were analysed and systematized very elaborately.
2.2. THE FIVE AGGREGATES OF EXISTENCE (PAÑCA-KHANDHA)
2.2.1 The Aggregates of Materiality (Rūpakkhandha)
The term “rūpakkhandha” consists of two terms “rūpa” and “khandha”127 ; rūpa is derived from the root “rūp” “to break up”, “to perish (nāsa)”. The word rūpa is well-known as it appeared in the six external āyatanas, i.e. rūpāyatana ; in the Paticcasamuppāda together with the word nāma, i.e. nāma-and-rūpa. The general characteristic of matter, or material elements, is impenetrability (sa-patighata), which is defined as the fact that space occupied by one of them cannot, at the same time, be occupied by another.128
In the Samyutta-Nikāya,129 like in the Vibhańga of the Abhidhamma, the usual way of defining the rūpa is : “Whatever there exists of corporeal things, whether past, present or future, far or near, all that belong to the corporeality group.” As regards its essence, rūpakkhandha includes all those material states that are subjects to the influence of heat and cold, that is to say, owing to the adverse condition of heat, cold, etc., rūpa will transform or assume a different mode. From the standpoint of human body mentioned in the Samyutta-Nikāya, rūpa means the four elements and the form depending of them, from the arising of food comes the arising of body.130 It is said in the Majjhima-Nikāya : “Space that is enclosed by bones and sinews and fresh and skin is known as body (rūpa).”131 According to the Khandha-yamaka, the rūpa is pure organic affections or states of mind. That is, the rūpa is regarded as a collection of observed processes, the body, as everything else, has only a conventional existence, it is continually created in consciousness (viññāna).132
It is said that rūpa, according to the earlier Abhidhammic literatures such as the Dhammasańganī, consists of four primary materials or underived elements (mahābhūtarūpa) and twenty-three generated materials or derived elements (upādā-rūpa). They are, therefore, reckoned as twenty-seven in number.133 Later, in the Milindapanhā, the Atthasālinī and the Visuddhimagga, there is further analysis of rūpa, and the hadayavatthu (heart-basis) has been included in the rupa making it twenty-eight in number.134
The rūpa is, therefore, classified into two groups. The first is called mahābhūta-rūpas135 and the second upādā-rūpas,136 which are four and twenty-four numbers respectively. We shall discuss them in more detail.
2.2.1.1 The Four Primary Elements (Mahābhūta-Rūpas)
The four mahābhūta-rūpas consist of the elements like earth, water, fire and air.137 They are named elements (dhātu) due to the retention of own form, and next the essence of earth, water, fire and air is earthy, watery, fiery and airy elements. The translucent matter of the sense-organs (rūpa-prasada) is very subtle ; it is like the shining of a jewel, it cannot be cut in two,138 it cannot be burnt,139 it has no weight,140 and it disappears without a residue at death.141 It is, nevertheless, atomic, and is represented by five different kinds of atoms. They are called primary because of their great manifestation. They are great, even though they are illusory, but they appear real. The great manifestation of four elements has been declared by the Buddha in the following stanza :
I declare the size of the earth to be two hundred thousand nahutas and four. Four hundred thousand nahutas and eight is of water and bulk ; air’s in space which reckoned is at nahutas six and nine times a hundred thousand ; in that this world of our lies. There is in the world consuming fire that will in mighty flames rise up to Brahma’s world for seven days.142
The above-mentioned passage shows the great manifestation of the primary elements. Therefore, they are essential, fundamental and inseparable materials for every material substance from the minute particles to the most massive objects. As regards the proximate cause, each one of the four elements allows the other three to be its proximate cause.143
The atoms of external matter are likewise divided into atoms of general, universal, or fundamental matter, and special atoms of colour-, sound-, tangibility-matter, etc. The fundamental elements are four in number ; they are manifested by the facts of hardness or repulsion, cohesion or attraction, heat and motion.144 Conventionally they are called earth, water, fire, and air ; but it is specified that these are only conventional appellations, and that in the name of the fourth general element (irana) alone both the technical and the usual meanings coalesce, because the word irana has both the significations of motion and air as well.145
1. Earth Element (Pathavī-dhātu) : It means the element of extension without which objects cannot occupy space. The word “pathavī” is derived from the root “puth” ‘to expend’. This element is said to be present in all the four elements, viz. earth, water, fire, and air; for example, the water above is supported by water below, the upward pressure results from the conjunction of the earthly and airy elements, while fiery watery elements cause the heat or cold and fluidity respectively.
The essence of earth element is described under the nature of hardness, strength, thickness, immobility, security and supporting. And the nature of this element can be described in both internal and external ways. The Human body consists of twenty parts which can hard and so on, in nature, viz., “head hairs” that grow on the inner skin that envelops the skull, “body-hairs” that grow on the inner skin that envelops the body, “nails”, “teeth”, “skin”, “flesh”, “sinew”, “bones”, “bone marrow”, “kidney”, “heart”, “liver”, “pleura”, “spleen”, “lungs”, “intestines”, “mesentery”, “stomach” and “brain”.146 So what is called earth element, such as head-hairs, etc., is a particular component of our body, without thought, indeterminate, void, not living being.147 The aforesaid constituents and the rest of the things of similar nature are said to be the internal earthy element. But all that exists outside the human body, consisting of similar hard nature, thus, being external is also called earthly elements, such as iron, steel, silver, gold and so on.
2. Water-Element (Āpo-dhātu) : The word “āpo” is derived from the root “āpa”. The water element is the element of cohesion. It makes scattered particles of matter cohere, and gives rise to the meaning of body. It is found even in minute particles, we can say, in all the four elements. It must be borne in mind that “cold” is not a characteristic of this element, but the nature of humidity, fluidity, increasing, leaping and cohesion are the essence of watery element.
There are certain elements of fluid nature that exist in human body, e.g., “bile” : The free bile is bound up with the life faculty and is to be found soaking the whole body, but the local bile is in the bile container, “phlegm”, “pus”, “blood”, “sweat”, “fat”, “tears”, “grease”, “spittle”, “snot”, “oils of the joints” and “urine” which is inside the bladder.148
The above mentioned elements, twelve in number, are called “internal watery elements”. They are the particular components of our body, without thought, indeterminate void, not a living being. There are certain things of watery nature which exist outside the human body, such as water in the canal, in the ocean, and so on. It is worth nothing here that the earthy and watery elements when combined together are thirty-two parts which constitute the body.
3. Fire Element (Tejo-dhātu) : Fire is the element of heat, as derived from the root “tij” “to mature”. Both heat and cold are included in this element. It is not like other three elements, because it has the power to regenerate the matter by itself. The nature of heating, maturing, consuming, etc., are the essence of this fiery element.
Like the other elements, the fire element may be both internal and external. The internal fire element finds its way in four forms : (1) The heat of warming up (santappati), (2) the heat of maturity (jariyati), (3) the heat of burning up (parideyhati), and (4) the heat of digestion (parinamati).149 There are certain fiery elements which exist outside the human body, such as the element of the village-burning fire, the district-burning fire, and so on, they are also identical with the internal fire elements.150 The fiery element is a particular component of the body, without thought and life, it is empty and a mere mode of maturing.151
4. Air Element (Vāyo-dhātu) : It is considered as the element of motion. Its root is vāya, to move, to vibrate. The air element is inevitably related to heat element. The nature of supporting, coldness, ingress and egress and easy movement are the essence of it.
The air element is both internal and external. The internal one operates in the following six ways : Air discharging upwards (uddhańgama-vāta), air discharging downwards (adhogama-vāta), air in the stomach (kucchisaya-vāta), air in the intestines (kotthāsaya-vāta), air supporting the movement of limbs (ańgamanganusarina-vāta), and the breath of inhalation and exhalation (assāsapassāsa-vāta). In the Majjhima-Nikāya,152 the external air element is mentioned thus : “When the external air element is agitated, it carries away villages, little town, districts and regions; and when the summer season comes, people are looking about wind by means of a palm fan and a fan for fanning the fire.”153 The air element is a particular element of the body, it is empty, thoughtless non-being.154
The fact that the fourth element is motion is an indication of the trend of this division ; the general elements of matter, like all Buddhist elements, are haring more forces than substances. These four elements appear always together, always in equal proportion. There is as much element of heat in a blazing flame as there is in wood or in water, and vice versa, the difference is only in their intensity. The general elements of matter, like all Buddhist elements appear always together, always in equal proportion
It should be noted here that the four primary elements do not literally mean earth, water, fire air, but the quality of them, that is, hardness and expansion ; fluidity and cohesion; heat; and motion.155 The four elements co-exist and are inseparable, but one may preponderate over another. It is to be noted here again, that the element of extension and cohesion are so closely interrelated that when cohesion ceases, extension disappears. Fire is the element of heat, and air, the element of motion. It is also said that movement is regarded as the force of heat. Motion and heat in the material realm correspond respectively to consciousness and karma in the mental. The function of the earth element is to act as foundation, of water as intensification, of fire as maintenance, of air as motion. The earth element manifests as receiving, the water as holding together, the fire as a continued supply of softness, the air as covering.156 These four are the fundamental units of matter (rūpa) and are invariably combined with the four derivatives, viz., colour, odour, taste and nutritive essence, as it is stated in the Visuddhimagga thus :
“Colour, odour, taste and nutritive essence, and the four element, from combination of these eight there comes the common usage head-hairs ; and separately from these eight there is no common usage head-hairs”.157
2.2.1.2 The Secondary Elements (Upādā-Rūpa)
There are twenty-four secondary materials described as derived materiality, as they are derived by grasping from (upādāya), or by depending on, the four great essential elements, like trees that spring thereform. The causal connection between the four mahābhūta-rūpas and the twenty-four upādāya-rūpas can be understood in the following aspects : (1) Producing cause : The derivative elements cannot arise apart from the activity of the mahābhūtas ; (2) reliance cause : Apart from the mahābhūtas, the derivatives have no intrinsic qualities of their own ; (3) establishing cause : Whenever the mahābhūtas manifest themselves, the derivatives undergo the like manifestation ; (4) sustaining cause : Depending on the mahābhūtas, the derivatives do not cease, but have a continuous development and (5) nourishing cause : The growth takes place due to the nourishing force of the mahābhūtas.158
In the Dhammasańganī, the Upādā-rūpas are described under the head “rāpakandam”. But in the Abhidhammatthasańgaha, the twenty-four upādā-rūpas have been further analysed and put under ten heads as follows ;
1. The five sensitive materiality (pasādarūpa) : The sensitive materials are five in number, viz., the eye (cakkhu), the ear (sota), the nose (ghāna), the tongue (jivhā) and the body (kāya).159 The word “pasāda” literally means “clearness” or “faith” being used to denote the receptive reaching sense agency. Therefore, the pasādarūpas tend to clarify the co-existing material qualities.
2. The five material qualities of sense-fields (gocararūpa or visayarūpa) : They are five in number,160 namely, (6) form (rūpa), (7) sound (sadda), (8) smell (gandha), (9) taste (rasa), and (10) tangible objects (photthabba).161
It is necessary to point out here that the above mentioned two groups are related to each other. The sensitive materiality (1-5) function within a specific domains of their activities, i.e. sense-objects (6-9), without encroaching in to other domain of actions. The exclusive function of the eye is to see, the ear to hear, the nose to smell, and so on. There are several discourses which warn the monks to guard against or control the sense-organs in order to avoid falling prey to sensual pleasure resulting in declination.162
3. The two material qualities of sex (bhāvarūpa) : They are two in number, namely, (10) femininity (itthindriya) and (ii) masculinity (purisindriya). According to the Dhammasańganī, itthindriya is that which is of the female, feminine in appearance, in characteristics, in occupation, and in condition and being. Even the male can be seen alike. The bhāvarūpas are born of karma.163 Buddhism absolutely believes in the efficacy of karma in determining our future life or rebirth. The fact of the past karma remains unaltered. However, the social environment may also sanction any position to human beings.
4. The physical basis of mind(hadaya-rūpa) : It is of one kind and is known as heart basis (hadayavatthu) on which we believe that the mind is located and functions. It should be noted here that the word hadayavatthu did not occur in Tipitakas, except in the patthāna of the Abhidhamma a word “vatthu” alone, not the word hadaya, has been used. The heart basis or the physical basis of mind is not heart itself. It is a kind of subtle matter that is found inside the heart and is identified as the seat of mental activity. According to the Visuddhimagga,164 it is united by temperature, consciousness and nutriment. It is further mentioned in the Abhidhammattha-vibhāvinī 165 that the hadayavatthu serves as the “base” for (1) two categories of mental factors, namely, the mind-element (manodhātu), which refers to the thoughts of awareness of reception of sense objects, (2) the mind cognition factor, namely, the mind-consciousness-element (manoviññāna-dhātu), which refers to all other thoughts.
5. The material quality of life (jivita-rūpa) : It is of one kind known as the life faculty (jīvitindriya), which is itself the effect of karma. As we have already seen that karma-born can explain the coming of faculties of sex into being as the male or female, and in this sense it explains the life faculty itself. In the Dhammasańganī its characteristic and function are mentioned thus : “The life faculty is the persistence of the corporeal states, their subsistence, their going on, their being kept going on, their progress, their continuance, preservation, life as a faculty, this is that from which is vitality.”166 Therefore, the life faculty is the vital force, which controls the material qualities produced by karma and keeps them alive.
6. The material quality of nutrition (āhāra-rūpa) : It is of one kind known as the edible food or nutriment (kavalinkārāhāra), which refers to the quality of nourishing.167 It means food which helps the living beings to sustain and grow. In the Dhammasańganī, it means to suggest nutritive food, such as milk, curd, and so on.168 Food is found to be one of the twenty-four conditions (paccaya) and one of the four causes (hetu) that support the material quality after life. The nutritive quality (oja) is found in all matter, in living beings because it is regarded as one of the four essences of four primary elements (dhātu).
7. The material quality of delimitation (pariccheda-rūpa) : It is of one kind known as space-element (ākāsa-dhātu),169 which refers to a quality that provides an accommodation for the existence of various types of material qualities. The ākāsa is also recognized as dhātu in the sense of non-entity, not as an existing element like the four primary essentials.170 The Vibhańga mentions two types of space-element, viz., the internal and the external. The cavities of nose and mouth door are internal (ajjhattika ākāsa-dhātu). In the same way, we find such cavities in the well and the door-space that are outside the body being called “external space” (bahiddhā-ākāsa-dhātu).171 It is necessary to note here that in respect of four and six elements, ākāsa-dhātu is called ākāsa-rūpa, which is reckoned as rūpa-dhamma, one of the 24 derivatives (upādā-rūpas). But in the case of arūpa-jhānas ‘immaterial absorptions’, ākāsa or space is regarded as arūpa or immaterial, because it is really invisible. Even though it is immaterial, it is not consciousness or nāma-dhamma, but arūpa-dhamma.
8. The material quality of communication (viññatti-rūpa) : They are of two kinds, namely, the bodily intimation or gesture (kāyaviññatti) and the verbal intimation or speech (vacīviññatti),172 which refer to a quality known as peculiarity or individuality. Each person has a personality of his own. The bodily movement is originated by air-element and consciousness, but the verbal one by earth-element and consciousness. Our intentions and ideas are thus manifested by making use of gesture and speech.
9. The material quality of plasticity or alterability (vikāra-rūpa) : They are five in number,173 namely lightness or agility (rūpassa lahutā), pliancy or elasticity (rūpassa mudutā), adaptability (rūpassa kammaññatā), and two kinds of gesture (viññatti-rūpas), hence they are uncounted. These three characteristics of matter pertain to the body of a living person in the sense that when the body is in perfect order for the cultivation of mental culture, it is in the states of lightness (lahu),wield-ness (kammañña) and radiance (mudu).174
10. The material quality of salient features (lakkhana-rūpa) : They are four in number, namely, growth (rūpassa upaccaya), continuity (rūpassa santati), decay (rūpassa jaratā) and impermanence (rūpassa aniccatā).175 These four states of matter are related to each other in this way : The growth or integration (upaccaya) covers the phenomenon starting from the moment of conception to the point of accumulating sense-organs. It continues (santati) growing in different forms. Then starts the decaying of the body that appears in the form of brokenness of teeth (khandhicca), grey hair (pālicca) and wrinkles (valittacatā), and so on, the decay (jaratā) ultimately leads to the final dissolution of the body, indicating its impermanence (aniccatā).176 Thus the story of the rūpa, roughly covering four states, reveals the fact of its being transitory and finally adhering to the doctrine of anattā.
The twenty-eight types of rūpa apart from being divided into mahābhūtarūpa and upādāyarūpa can also be divided into two main kinds : (1) Perfect matters (nipphanna-rūpa), whose real characteristics never change otherwise, refer to eighteen materials, namely, four mahābhūtarūpas, five pasādarūpas, four gocararūpas, two bhāvarūpas, one hadayarūpa, one jīvitarupa, and one āhārarūpa; and (2) imperfect matters (anipphannarūpa), whose characteristics are always changing, are ten in number, namely, one kind of paricchedarūpa, two of viññattirūpa, three of vikārarūpas and four of lakkhanarāpas.177 In other words, nipphannarūpas mean the conditioned materials, that is, they are conditioned or produced by previous karma called karma-born.178
The important point is that according to Buddhism, dhātu (element) means anything that exists by its own nature, that which is different from science. Taking heat for example, the latter regards heat as energy, but the former takes it as an element (dhātu). In Buddhism, even space (ākāsa) is regarded as element, that is, space-element. Therefore, there are six kinds of elements, namely, four primary elements, space element and consciousness element. The elements are further classified into eighteen. Whereas the six elements and eighteen elements can be reduced to matter and mind (rūpa-nāma), the four primary elements can only be reduced to matter (rūpa). In the Visuddhimagga,179 the meaning of element is elaborately explained. Its purpose is to eradicate the idea of permanent soul. Buddhism accepts the even-changing element, due to its change it has no permanent entity, it is, therefore, soulless.
2.2.2 The Aggregate of Feeling (vedanakkhandha)
The word “vedanā” which is derived from the root “vid” to cognize, means all kinds of knowledge. In general, it has been used in the sense of feeling or sensation, which is something latent in human personality. Under normal conditions feelings are always present in us, since they are essential properties of every consciousness. A definition given in the Samyutta-Nikāya180 and the Majjhima Nikāya181 is : “By what is felt is meant feeling”. Or, “it is felt, therefore, it is called feeling.”
How does feeling arise? “In dependence on contact arises feeling (vedanā).”182 It is said that “the four mahābhūtas are the hetu (cause) or paccaya (condition) for the communication of the rūpakkhandha ; contact (phassa) is the cause of communication of feeling (vedanā) ; sense-contact is the hetu or paccaya for the communication of saññā … of sańkhāra…”183 Thus not only feelings arise on account of the sense contact, but saññā and sańkhāra also arise therefrom.
From the point of its nature, feeling is one kind, as being experienced by mind only. From the point of sense-organs, it is of two kinds, namely, bodily and mental.184 From the intrinsic nature, it is of three kinds : Blissful, painful and neutral feelings.185 In other words, it is of three kinds in accordance with the ethical point : wholesome, unwholesome and indeterminate feelings. That which is associated with wholesome consciousness is wholesome, and the like.186 In this way, feeling has been counted as eighty-nine equivalent to all types of consciousness.
There are four kinds of feelings from the point of law, viz., meritorious, demeritorious, retributive and objective.187 And five kinds from the standpoint of faculties.188 The first two are physical, and the last three are mental. The Samyutta Nikāya says of feeling as six kinds : Feeling arises from eye-contact, from sound, odour, taste, body and mind.189 From the point of method, it is of seven kinds thus : Feeling born of eye contact, … ear… nose… tongue… body… mind-element… and mind consciousness.190
The commentary of the Dhammasańganī compares feeling as a king or master who enjoys the dish prepared by the cook. The cook here means the remaining mental states that constitute a thought-complex.191 The characteristic of feeling is to enjoy the taste of objects.192
Strictly speaking, it is feeling that experiences an object when it comes into contact with the senses. Similarly, it is this feeling that experiences the desirable or undesirable fruits of an action done in this or in a previous birth. Feeling is more likely than any of the other aggregates to serve for us to cling. One is inclined to pleasant feeling to the extent of being lustful. Feeling is a primary objective of all our striving and activity.
The Arahant also experiences the three kinds of feeling,193 but he feels them as one that is freed from pleasure which is a bondage. It is true hat Nirvanic bliss is not connected with feeling. Because Nirvāna is the happiness (sukha) or relief from suffering. It is not enjoyment of the pleasurable objects. Feeling in the “five khandhas is an aggregate but in the Paticcasamuppāda it is rather a conditioned process”. With regard to feeling, it should be known that “whatever there exists of feeling, whether of past, present or future, internal or external, gross or subtle, lofty or low, far or near, physical or psychical, all that belongs to the vedanakkhandha.”194
2.3 The Aggregate of Perception (Saññākkhandha)
The word “saññā” is derived from the root “ñā”, to know. It is difficult to find the English equivalent of saññā, so it is better to use it untranslated, but its general meaning is recognized as “perception”, as it becomes evident from the Majjhima-Nikāya : “It perceives, therefore, it is saññā.”195 And also it is declared in the Samyutta-Nikāya : “why, monks, do you say saññā? Because it perceives”. The question is further continued : What does it perceive ? It perceives blue, green, yellow, red and white.196 Here saññā is defined as only rūpasaññā (visual perception). But, according to the Buddha, saññākkhandha is of six kinds : Saññā of forms, sounds, smells, tastes, touches and mental images.197
Saññā has many meanings. Nonetheless, the chief characteristic of saññā is the cognition of an object. This is the process of becoming aware, similar to waking up as opposed to being sound asleep or unconscious, or dead. It refers to memory as well as an awareness of sense impressions, covering both the primary sensations resulting from contact with an object by way of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind including the recall of previous impressions. Therefore, saññā when viewed from different standpoints, assumes the various characteristics, as follows. From the point of nature, it is single, that is, only the mind apprehends objects. It is of two kinds from the point of black and white, namely, reversal and non-reversal perception.198 From the point of demerit it is of three kinds, namely, lustful, hating and harming perception. From merit-point of view it is of opposite nature. From the point of not knowing the significance of sense-organs, it is of four kinds, namely, the perception of ugly as beautiful, of ill as well, of impermanence as permanence, of not-self as self. And from the point of knowing the significance of sense-organs it is of four opposite kinds such as the perception of ugly as ugly and so on. From the point of object, it is six in number as mentioned earlier. By way of door there are seven kinds : Perception born of eye-contact, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind element and consciousness element-contact.199
In conclusion, we may say that, from the ethical point of view, saññā is classified into (1) wholesome, (2) unwholesome, and (3) indeterminate. These three varieties come into play while associate with the related types of consciousness. That is to say, every type of consciousness must be accompanied by perception, in other words, what may be called ideation, in accordance with the following contexts. Following this view-point, the varieties of perception must be reckoned as eighty-nine corresponding to different states of consciousness that will be stated later.
2.2.3.1 Saññā or Perception as a Source of Valid Knowledge or Pramāna
It is true that every school of Indian philosophy has its own theory of perception. Of all the methods of knowledge, perception is the most fundamental. In the West perception has received a peculiar homage, as being the source of the most undoubted path of human knowledge regarding the theory of reality.200 Like the West, Buddhism regards perception as the very basic and presupposition of all knowledge, and a greater emphasis is laid on paranormal perception, that is, six kinds of Ultra-conscious Insight (abhiññā) : (1) magical power, for example, assuming multiple forms, and so on, (2) clairaudience, (3) penetration of the mind of others, (4) retrocognitive knowledge, (5) clairvoyance, and (6) knowledge of the destruction of all defilements.201 The last three known as the threefold knowledge are more emphasized by the Buddha as they support to the realisation of the ultimate goal in Buddhism, that is, the doctrine of samsāra, karma and the Four Noble Truths.202 Apart from perception, inference (anumāna) is also accepted by the Buddha such as the following statements : “The five khandhas, monks, are impermanent, what is impermanent, that is suffering, what is suffering, that is void of the self, what is void of the self, that is not mine, I am not this, it is not my self.”203
According to Buddhism, inference must be based on perceptual knowledge, both normal and para-normal. Buddhism does not accept pure reasoning (takka) which has no basis in ascertained truth as is evident from the Buddha’s words that the Dharma is beyond pure reasoning and is based on one’s direct personal experience.204 The Buddha’s acceptance of perception as independent valid means of knowledge is well evidenced from his address to the Kālāmas that should not accept anything by mere reports, … by authority of religious texts, by logic, by inference, … but examine it for themselves, and accept it or give up it when they had themselves known it.205 In this way, the Buddha is known as the experientialist ‘who depends on personal experience of higher knowledge’, not as the traditionalist, (anussāvika), or the rationalist and metaphysician (takkī, vīmamsī).206
Strictly speaking, there are three sources of knowledge, and three kinds of knowledge according to their sources as follows :
1. Suttamaya-paññā ; knowledge that is acquired by learning systematically in different institutions (knowledge resulting from study). This kind of knowledge is always dependent on others and it can be contrasted with sabdapramāna (testimony) in Indian philosophy.
2. Cintāmaya-paññā ; knowledge that is developed in research work in various fields and is acquired through systematic thinking (knowledge resulting from reflection). It is comparable to anumāna-pramāna (inference).
3. Bhāvanāmaya-paññā ; knowledge that arises as a result of mental development, direct experience, and pure and extra perception (knowledge resulting from mental practice) which is comparable to pratyaksa-pramāna (perception). It may be noted here that the first two belong to the realm of worldly knowledge and the last one the super mundane knowledge. Of all the ten kinds of faith-principle in the Kālāma-Sutta the first to fourth and the tenth are grouped into the suttāmaya-paññā or testimony ; the fifth to ninth is included in cintāmaya-paññā or inference. The Buddha does not accept these two kinds of knowledge, but he points out that these two kinds of knowledge should be examined and ascertained by direct experience or perception. If they are in agreement with perception, they are then valid knowledge.
They are two kinds of perception, namely, pure perception or nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and perception of obsession (papañca-saññā) or savikalpa (determinate). Buddhism accepts only the first one which is perception for the first time as it really is to be valid means of knowledge. The former one belongs to Arahant while the latter to the ordinary people.
In early Buddhism, pure perception is based on understanding of wisdom (paññā), but erroneous perception (papañca-saññā) is based on ignorance (avijjā). The purpose of pure perception leads to the destruction of suffering. Early Buddhism viewed perception in terms of pure and impure, hence there is no problem of perception. All schools of Indian philosophy are varied according to their own ideas. However, all schools of Buddhist thought seem to agree with each other that perception is a cognition which is not at all subjectively determined and is not modified by ideas or concepts, such as the conceptions of genus, of quality, of action, of name and of substance.207 Because in reality there is no difference between these conceptions and the particular individuals. There is no difference between the phenomenal world and the individual world. We think them different due to illusion called distortion of perception (saññā-vipallāsa) rooted in ignorance, desire an attachment. The real Buddhists perceive things in terms of impermanence, oppression, and no-self, which are known as ultimate or absolute truth. The terms as person, living being and self are considered by Buddhists as conventional truth. We can say that the different ideas of perception arise because of the different ideas of concepts such as self and so on.
2.2.3.2 The Perception of Obsession (Papañca-saññā)
Perception (saññā) is, as already stated, one of the mental concomitants; the fully developed perception is one of the special functions of viññāna (consciousness). Perception arises between consciousness and feeling, that is, consciousness dependent on feeling born of visual impact.208 Perception determines the manner of objects by means of the agreement between the old experience and new one. It is the keeping and collecting processes of the learning materials for the purpose of being thought-data. Hence perception has consciousness for its precondition.
It should be noticed that, when perception plays an important role as said earlier, man is likely to attach to merely perception. Perception, therefore, becomes obstacle that conceals the profound truth. This kind of perception is called papañca-saññā (the perception of obsession). It is always accompanied by desire (tanhā), conceit (māna) and view (ditthi), that hinder the spiritual process.209 With the obstacles so-called, sańkhāras are compounded (papañcasaññā).210 An instance of papañcasaññā in respect of ditthi (view) is : “Those who do not understand, as they really are, the rise and fall of the view of becoming and the view of annihilation, they find pleasure in papañca, are devoted to papañca.”211 The following problems, such as the problem of the world, soul and Arahant after death, are regarded as papañca.212 “Who is given to papañca, he will fail to reach Nirvāna.”213
The way to end the papañca is mentioned in the Ańguttara-Nikāya thus : “By the passionless ending without remainder of the six modes of contact, there is ending of papañca”. 214 The above quotation signifies that the most important method is samādhi. And the freedom from papañca should be a permanent state as that of the Arahants.
2.2.3.3 The Distortion of Perception (Saññā-vippallāsa)
There are four kinds of distorted perceptions mentioned in the Ańguttara-Nikāya215 beginning with (1) the distortion of perception by regarding what is impermanent as permanent, (2) by regarding what is painful as pleasant, (3) by regarding what is without self as a self and (4) by regarding what is impure as pure. Considering from the aforesaid four points of distortions, we realize that feeling (vedanā), desire (tanhā) and attachment (upādāna) are the root causes of the distorted perceptions. And the most important cause is desire as it is said : “Dependent on feeling arises desire, by the utter fading away and ceasing of desire, becoming cease.”216 According to Buddhism, when desire is controlled, freedom is realized, then only perception becomes pure. As it is stated : “He sees a form without passion but with his mindfulness, he feels it with the non-attachment of mind, therefore, he is reduced not increased.”217
If saññā-vippallāsa is rooted in tanhā, and so on, like the papañca-saññā, then it can be said that saññā-vippallāsa itself is relatively caused by papañca-saññā. It should be understood that saññā-vipallāsa does not confine itself to only visual perception, but covers all kinds of sense-objects, such as auditory perception, and so on, just like the papañca-saññā. Buddhism regards the so-called papañca-saññā as erroneous perception.
2.2.4 The Aggregate of Mental Formation (sańkhārakkhandha)
Etymologically, sańkhāra is a combination of two words, ‘sam’ (together), and ‘kar’ (to do). Sańkhāra, therefore, means the resultant mental state or the putting together resulted through mental activities. Sańkhāra as one of the five khandhas is usually used in plural forms. The sańkhāra-khandha is nothing but the aggregate of mental activities. “what is only a mass of sańkhāra, there no “being” is found.”218 All component things are called sańkhāra as set forth in the well-known statements : “All sańkhāras are impermanent, all sańkhāras are suffering (sabbe sańkhārā aniccā, sabbe sańkhārā dukkhā).219
The term ‘sańkhāra’ when used in conceptional sense, means volition (cetanā) or intention (sañcetanā), as the following statements show : “there are six classes of volitional states with regard to visual objects, sounds, odours, tastes, bodily impressions and mind-objects.”220 In this way, all activities are related to volition. The Buddha, therefore, in the Ańguttara-Nikāya, said : “Volition, monks, I call action (karma) ; having intended one performs action.”221 It is worth nothing that the word ‘cetanā’ cannot be translated as ‘will’, because there is no personality permanent in Buddhism. According to the Buddha’s teachings, cetana is an element or force which arranges (sañceyati) the impressions, and the term ‘sańkhāra’ stands for force as a patent fact, i.e. volitional action. Only volitional action produces kamma-formation (sańkhāra). It is said that such volitional activities which are either good or bad accumulate the effect of an action which are moral or immoral done through feeling, perception and consciousness, by ways of three channels, namely, body, speech and mind. Because cetanā is said to bring together two or more mental activities on which the other three khandhas do not set the mind into action. On the other hand, sańkhāra is different from others in the sense that its functional power is to determine the future forms of those khandhas in future birth. Therefore, it may be pointed out that sańkhāras are the resultant mental states, the accumulated effects of the three other khandhas; vedanā, saññā, and viññāna do not set the mind into action, but leave this to sańkhāras.
The difference between sańkhāra in the five aggregates and in the doctrine of dependent origination is determined by their characteristics and functions. Whereas the sańkhāra in the former acts as merely the constituents of mental activities, like a still stopping car, in the latter it is acting process of it as the car which is running. As already stated, sańkhāra itself refers to all mental states which are fifty in number in accordance with the Abhidhamma. The fifty mental states are known as psychic factors (cetasikas) which include the aggregates, fifty-two in number, constitute the contents of consciousness known as psychic factors, because they are always associated with the consciousness (citta). “They arise and perish together with consciousness, they function on the same objects and bases with consciousness.”222 The fifty-two cetasikas are broadly divided into three main divisions, and each one is further grouped under primary and secondary factors.
2.2.4.1 The Unwholesome Mental Formations
The biggest group of the defiled mental formations is mentioned in Majjhimanikāya and Ańguttaranikāya. They are sixteen in number which are as follows :
“Oh monks, what are the defilements of mind ? They are :
- Abhijjhā-visamalobha (Excessive covetousness),
- Byāpāda (Ill-will),
- Godha (Anger),
- Upadāna (Grudge),
- Makkha (Depreciation),
- Palāsa (Envious rivalry),
- Issā (Jealously),
- Macchariya (Stinginess),
- Māyā (Deceit),
- Sāthayya (Hypocrisy),
- Thambha (Obstinacy),
- Sārambha Presumption,
- Māna (Conceit),
- Atimāna (Excessive conceit),
- Mada (Venity),
- Pamāda (Heedlessness).
These are the defilements of mind.”223
Contrasted to the Nikāya, only the eight kinds of defilements of mind are found in Dhamma-sańganī. They are :
- Micchāditthi (wrong view),
- Lobha (Greed),
- Moha (Ignorance),
- Ahirika (Lack of shame of evil action),
- Anottappa (Absence of fear of the evil action),
- Dosa (Aversion),
- Vicikicchā (Doubt),
- Udhacca (Restlessness).224
In addition to these, the Atthasālinī has introduced some more kinds of demeritorious mental formations, namely,
- Māna (Pride),
- Issā (Jealousy),
- Macchariya (Stinginess),
- Thīna (Sloth),
- Middha (Torpor),
- Uddhacca (Restlessness),
- Kukkucca (worry).225
To summed up now we have the fourteen types of demeritorious mental formations which are originally given in the Nikāya and are later systematically rearranged in Abhidhammattha-sańgaha.
2.2.4.2 The fourteen Types of the Demeritorious Mental Formations
These are divided into five main sub-classes viz.226
I.Mo-catuka group which has ‘moha’ as the chief of the other four
mental formations which is said to arise to all types of unwholesome consciousness namely :
- Moha (delusion),
- Ahirika (shamelessness),
- Anottappa (fearlessness),
- Udhacca (restlessness). II.Lo-tika group means the three-fold group of mental states which
begins with Lobha and which is associated with all eight types of immoral consciousness rooted in greed (Lobhamūla-citta) namely
- Lobha (greed/attachment)
- Ditthi (wrong view)
- Māna (conceit)
III.Do-catuka group means the four-fold group of mental states
Beginning with Dosa which is said to manifest in two kinds of immoral consciousness rooted in ill-will (Dosamūlacitta) namely
- Dosa (Hatred/Ill-will),
- Issā (Jealousy),
- Macchariya (Avarice),
- Kukkucca (Worry).
IV. Thi-duka group means the pair of mental formations began with Thīna namely :
- Thīna (Sloth)
- Middha (Torpor)
And the last one which is single viz.,
1.Vicikiccha (Doubt).
This group is collectively called “Akusala-cetasika” or demeritorious
mental properties. Out of fourteen, the six kinds according to Abhidhammatthasańgaha are called “Aniyatayogi” (indefinitely associated mental states), i.e., māna, issā, macchariya, kukucca, thīna and middha, because they are uncertainly associated with immoral consciousness.227
Māna or pride is supposed to arise in four kinds of immoral consciousness rooted in attachment unaccompanied by wrong view, when egoism or selfish alone (Ahamkāra) exists. Issā, Macchariya and Uddhacca which are supposed to manifest in two classes of unwholesome consciousness rooted in ill-will (Dosamūlacitta) do not arise simultaneously, that is to say they arise one after another in accordance with their sequences.
Similarly Thīna-middha are said to arise in the five types of immoral consciousness prompted (Akusala-sasańkhārika-citta) when they are very weak, otherwise these mental formations are not available.228 These six kinds of mental formations can be compared with Aniyatabhūmika-dharmas and Aniyata-kilesa-dharmas of the other two schools which will be dealt with later.
2.2.4.3 The General and Wholesome Mental Formations (Aññasamāna and kusala Cetasika)
What are called “dhamma”, fifty-six in number are found discussed in the first great meritorious consciousness pertaining to the sense-sphere (Kāmāvacara-mahākusala-citta) of Dhammasańganī229. They are :
“Phassa (contact), vedanā (feeling), saññā (perception), cetanā (volition), vitakka (initial application), vicāra (sustained application), pīti (joy), sukha (pleasure), cittassekaggatā (one pointedness of mind), saddhindriya (faculty of faith), viriyindriya (faculty of energy), satindriya (faculty of mindfulness), samādhindriya (faculty of concentration), paññindriya (faculty of wisdom), manindriya (faculty of mind), somanassindriya (faculty of pleasant feeling, jīvitindriya (faculty of life), sammāditthi (right understanding), sammāsańkappa (right thought), sammāvāyāma (right effort), sammāsati (right mindfulness), sammāsamādhi (right concentration), saddhābala (power of belief), viriyabala (power of energy), satibala (power of mindfulness), samādhibala (power of concentration), paññābala (power of fear of evil), alobha (non-attachment), adosa (non-hatred), amoha (non-delusion), anabhijjhā (non-greed), abyāpāda (good-will), sammāditthi (right view), hiri (shame of evil), ottappa (fear of evil), kāya-passaddhi (tranquility of mental states), citta-passaddhi (tranquility of mind), kāya-lahutā lightness of mental states, citta-lahutā (lightness of mind), kāyamudutā (pliancy of mental states), citta-mudutā (pliancy of mind), kāya-kammaññatā (adaptability of mental states), citta-kammaññatā (adaptability of mind), kāya-pāguññatā (proficiency of mental states), citta-pāguññatā (proficiency of mind), kāyujukatā (rectitude of mental states), cittujukatā (rectitude of mind), sati (mindfulness), sampajañña self-awareness, samatha (calmness), vipassanā (insight), paggaha (effort), and avikkhepa (meditation).”
Considering only the essence of the 56 types of mental formations and over looking the identical ones, the numbers are reduced to twenty-nine only as the Atthasālinī holds :230
“… By taking the identical and unrepeated mental formations into account, here, there are fivefold groups such as contact, the initial application (vitakka), discuretive thinking (vicāra), joy (pīti), one pointedness of mind (cittaggatā), the fivefold faculty, two powers, i.e., power of shame and the power of fear of evil, two roots, i.e., non-attachment and non-hatred and the twelve dhammas such as the tranquility of mental formations and that of mind, therefore, there are thirty dhammas only.”
Here omitting the mind (citta) which is belonging to the first fivefold group, we will have the twenty-nine types of the general and wholesome mental formations as expounded in Dhammasańganī. These twenty-nine types plus nine types of the “whatever group” of Atthasālinī become 38 in total and including the aforesaid fourteen demeritorious mental formations, there are fifty-two on the whole.
Now let us consider the nine kinds of the “whatever group” of the mental formations as discusses in Atthasālinī as follows :231
- Chanda (desire to do),
- Adhimokkha (determination),
- Manasikāra (attention),
- Tattra-majjhattatā (indifference),
- Karunā (compassion),
- Muditā (altruistic joy),
- Kāya-ducaritā-virati (abstinence from wrong bodily conduct),
- Vacī-ducarita-virati (abstinence from wrong verbal action),
- Micchājīva-virati (abstinence from wrong livelihood).
Here the last three mental formations, i.e., Kāya…, vacī-ducarita-virati, and Micchajīva-virati are identified with the three factors of the eight-fold noble path, i.e., Sammākammanta (right action), Sammāvācā (right speech), and Sammā-ājīva (right livelihood) respectively.
However, these thirty-eight types of mental formations can be divided into two main groups as discussed by Abhidhammattha-sańgaha.
2.2.4.4 The General Mental Formations (Aññasamānā cetasika) ;
They alone are classified into two sub-groups i.e.,
I. The seven kinds of universal mental properties (sabba-citta-sādhārana-cetasika) which manifest in all classes of consciousness. They are :
(1) Phassa (contact),
(2) Vedanā (feeling),
(3) Saññā (perception),
(4) Cetanā (volition),
(5) Ekaggatā (one pointedness),
(6) Jīvitindriya (psychic life),
(7) Manasikāra (attention).
Here Vedanā is the Vedanākkhandha and so is Saññā, only Manasikāra was taken from the “Yevaāanaka” group while the remaining four are pertaining to the “Niyata group” of Dhammasańganī.
II. The six kinds of particular group of mental formations (Pakinnaka cetasika) which indefinitely manifest in some classes of consciousness are :
- Vitakka (initial application),
- Vicāra (sustained application),
- Adhimokkha (decision),
- Vīriya (effort),
- Pīti (joy),
- Chanda (conation).232
III. The twenty-five kinds of the beautiful mental formations (Sobhana
cetasika) which are said to arise in only all classes of wholesome consciousness are as follows :233
- Saddhā (confidence),
- Sati (mindfulness),
- Hiri (moral shame),
- Ottappa (moral dread),
- Alobha (non-attachment),
- Adosa (good will),
- Tatramajjhattatā (equanimity),
- Kāya-passaddhi (tranquility of mental states),
- Citta-passaddhi (tranquility of mind),
- Kāya-lahutā (lightness of mental states),
- Citta-lahutā (lightness of mind),
- Kāya-mudutā (pliancy of mental states),
- Citta-mudutā (pliancy of mind),
- Kāya-kammaññatā (adaptability of mental states),
- Citta-kammaññatā (adaptability of mind),
- Kāya-pāguññatā (proficiency of mental states),
- Citta-pāguñatā (proficiency of mind),
- Kāyujukatā (rectitude of mental states),
- Cittujukatā (rectitude of mind),
- Sammā-vācā (right speech),
- Sammā-kammanta (right action),
- Sammā-ājīva (right livelihood),
- Karunā (compassion),
- Muditā (sympathetic joy),
- Paññindriya (faculty of wisdom)
According to the Abhidhammattha-sańgaha, the numbers 1 to 19 are Called “Sobhana-sādhārana-cetasika,” the universal beautiful mental formations, since they are said to arise in all classes of moral consciousness, the number 20, 21 and 22 are called ‘Viratis’ (abstinences) which are called by other name of the aforesaid Kāya-ducarita-virati, vacī-ducarita-virati and micchā-ājīva-virati pertaining to the ‘yevāpanaka group’ of Atthasāalinī which are called ‘Appamaññā’ because they have the unlimited living beings as objects.
2.2.5 The Aggregate of Consciousness (Viññānakkhandha)
In Buddhism the following Pāli words, nāma, citta, mana and viññāna are all used as synonymous terms whose English equivalent refers to ‘mind’ or ‘consciousness’.234 “when the so-called being is divided into two parts, nāma (mind) is used ; when it is divided into khandhas, viññāna is used ; citta is employed while referring to different classes of consciousness; in the ordinary sense of mind, citta and mana are frequently used.”235 The Nikāyas define viññāna as an element (dhātu) which is invisible, boundless and all-penetrating.236 The nature of citta or viññāna is the awareness or cognition of an object.237 It is awareness (vijānāti), therefore, it is called viññāna, it cognizes, therefore, it is called viññāna.”238 According to the Abhidhamma, citta is described as the first one of the four basic principles (paramattha). It has been said in the Early Buddhist texts that citta or viññāna is pure and luminous in its nature, but defiled by unwholesome psychic factors.239 Because of the psychic factors, consciousness can be wholesome, unwholesome or indeterminate. According to the Dhammapada, citta is flickering difficult to control and only the wise man can straighten it. It cannot be perceived, and is extremely subtle and bodiless ; it roams wherever it likes, it lies in a cave, i.e. our body.240
Viññānakkhandha is not an entity always existing, called consciousness, but an aggregate of consciousness arising out of conditions, brought about by contact (phassa) of a sense-organ (indriya) and a sense-object (visaya). If there is no contact as classified above, there is no consciousness appearing at the moment. Taking an eye-consciousness (cakkhu- viññāna), for example, it arises in relation (paccaya) with sense of vision (cakkhu-indriya) and with some colour and shape, i.e., the contact between the internal sense-organs and the external objects.241 In this sense one should not misunderstand consciousness to be synonymous with recognition. Consciousness is a simple consciousness or awareness of the presence of an object. It is not the recognition of the object ; the recognition is the function of saññā, not of viññāna. From the above mentioned instance, consciousness and objects are related to each other by means of ārammana-paccaya (the relation of presentation), i.e., that of the subject and object.242 It is just like a devotee who gets a wholesome consciousness at the sight of the image of the Buddha. Here, the image of the Buddha is as the object, the devotee as the subject and the existing relation between them is known as ārammana-paccaya.243
Viññāna is found used in both the contexts, the paticcasamuppāda and the five khandhas. The former refers to patisandhi-viññāna, the latter refers to the conscious process which arises by means of the contact of sense-organs and their respective objects, which are named after as cakkhu-viññāna… mano-viññāna respectively.244 In this way viññāna is nothing but a stream of consciousness ; it never exists for two moments ; it continues to persist by the continuous process of arising, sustaining and perishing, and each process is called a moment.
Generally speaking, consciousness is of one kind, but when it is viewed from different standpoints, its number is multiplied. In all, the consciousness-khandha according to the Abhidhamma is of 89 or 121 types from the moral standpoint, which is classified under threefold consciousness, namely, wholesome (kusala), unwholesome (akusala) and indeterminate (avyakata). The last one is further divided into vipāka-citta and kiriyācitta. The threefold citta is again subdivided according to the four planes, in which the existence of beings is divided. They are the consciousness of the sensual plane (kāmāvacarabhūmi-citta), the consciousness of the fine material plane (rūpāvacarabhūmi-citta), the consciousness of the immaterial plane (arūpāvacarabhūmi-citta) and the consciousness of the super mundane plane (lokuttarabhūmi-citta).245
2.5.1. The Classification of Mind in Suttas
Based on the three defilements, Mind, according to the Suttas is divided as follows :
“What is mind? This mind is, in fact, of the multiple and manifold quires, that is to say, one is lustful mind, one is ill-willed mind and another is a deluded mind”.246
Based on the six sense-organs through which consciousness perceives the objects, it is, as expounded throughout Suttas, of the six classes of mind ; eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, bodily consciousness and mind-consciousness.247 Further, there is one popular style of classification wherein the Aggregate of consciousness is said to be divided into the past, the future and the present etc. it reads :
“Whatever consciousness, be its past, future, or present, in one self or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, is called the aggregate of consciousness”.248
It should be noted here that the six classes of consciousness as mentioned above is the oldest classification being accepted by all schools of Buddhism.
2.5.2. The Mind-Classification in Abhidhamma
Abhidhamma recognizes consciousness as one of the four ultimate realities (paramattha-dhamma), other three being constituents of consciousness (cetasika), matter or materiality (rūpa) and Nibbāna.249 However, philosophically speaking, a close examination of consciousness, as is described in the Abhidhamma tradition, appears to be similar to the view of W.S. Karunaratna, who states that
Abhidhammikas’ analysis of citta is informed and inspired by moral considerations and relevant to the ideals of philosophic detachment and religious emancipation.250
A brief survey of this subject-matter as depicted in some of the popular books on the Abhidhamma literature may easily help a reader appreciate Karunaratna’s point.
The Dhammasańganī, the first book of the Abhidhamma-Pitaka defines consciousness by way of many seemingly synonymous terms, which are very difficult to be differentiated.251 It is also quite possible that the original and contemporary meaning of each of those terms is now lost. However, W.S. Karunaratna takes an extreme view that those words are ‘altogether lacking in precision and discrimination’ and are ‘synonyms’.252
In Abhidhamma literature, first of all, the above mentioned six classes of consciousness are to be enlarged in terms of interpretations such as the five sense-consciousness which are said to be accompanied by the five-fold feelings, i.e. pleasant (Sukha-intriya) pain (Dukkha-intriya), etc. The body-consciousness is of two modes, i.e., being accompanied by pleasant feeling and pain. The mind consciousness (Manoviññāna) is also divided into two modes, i.e., mind-element (Mano-dhātu) and mind-conscious-element (Manoviññāna-dhātu) which are sub-divided into the three, i.e., moral (Kusala), immoral (Akusala) and neutral (Abyakata).253
Besides, there are the special explanations on the fivefold sense consciousness, for example, they have the different objects and bases (nānāvatthuka, nānārammanā), they do not perceive the object of each other (Na aññāmaññassa gocarāvisayam paccanubhonti). They cannot arise without intention (Na amanasikārā uppajjanti). They do not manifest simultaneously and do not arise in the orders (1, 2, 3) etc. (Na apubbam acarimam upajjanti. Na aññamaññassa smantarā uppajjanti). The five sense consciousness are not supposed to apprehend the objects in detail but just are falling to them (Pañcahi viññānehi na kiñci dhammam patijānāti aññatara abhinipātamattā).254
Therefore, even there are many external objects around us, we are supposed to know them all one by one, for our each consciousness arises to perceive only a single object according to the law of mind (Cittaniyāma). Consciousness, according to the Abhidhamma, being conditioned by the four conditions, is said to occur through (1) sense-organs (such as eye, ear etc.) (2) external objects (i.e. colour, sound…), (3) light (in the case of eye-consciousness) and (4) intention (manasikāra).255 Here, for example, the colour in the case of eye-consciousness must come into contact with the impaired eye-sense-organ in the open place or inside the room with sufficiency of light and intention towards such object is required. If any of them is deficient, the eye-consciousness could not take place.
Based on the four spheres, the consciousness, according to the Pāli literature is said to be divided into 89 or 121 types namely 54 types in sensuous sphere, 15 types in the fine material sphere, 12 types in the non-material sphere and 8 types or 40 types are transcendental.256
2.5.2.1. The 54 Types of consciousness Pertaining to Sense-sphere
The sub-division of the 54 types of consciousness has been made as follows :257
(a) the 30 types of the non-beautiful consciousness (Asobhana-citta).
(b) the 24 types of the beautiful consciousness (Sobhana-citta).
1. The 8 Types of Immoral Consciousness Rooted in Greed (Lobha-mūla-akusala-citta).
1. One consciousness unprompted and accompanied by pleasure and connected with wrong view (Somanassasahagatam ditthigatasampayutam asańkhārikamekam).
2. One consciousness prompted and accompanied by pleasure and connected with wrong view (Somanassasahagatam dittigatasampayuttam sasańkhārikam ekam).
3. One consciousness unprompted and accompanied by pleasure and disconnected with wrong view (Somanassasahagatam ditthigatavippayuttam asańkhārikam ekam).
4. One consciousness prompted and accompanied by pleasure and disconnected with wrong view (Somanassasahagatam ditthigatavippayuttam sasańkhārikam ekam).
5. One consciousness unprompted and accompanied by indifference and connected with wrong view (Upekkhā-sahagatam ditthigatasampayuttam asańkhārikam ekam).
6. One consciousness prompted and accompanied by indifference and connected with wrong view (Upekkhā-sahagatam ditthigatasampayuttam sasańkhārikam ekam).
7. One consciousness unprompted and accompanied by indifference and disconnected with wrong view (Upekkhā-sahagatam ditthigatavippayuttam asamkhārikam ekam).
8. One consciousness prompted and accompanied by indifference and disconnected with wrong view (Upekkhā-sahagatam ditthigatavippayuttam sasamkhārikam ekam).258
According to Pāli Abhidhamma, the consciousness rooted in the greed is mainly accompanied by three chief mental states, i.e. greed (Lobha), wrong view (Ditthi) and feelings (vedanā). Besides, about 18-20 types of mental states are said to arise in each consciousness rooted in attachment (Lobhamūla citta). Of the eight, the four types are accompanied by joy or pleasure (Somanassa vedanā) and another four accompanied by indifference (Upekkhā vedanā). The numbers 1, 2, and 5, 6, are associated with wrong view (Ditthigata-sampayutta). While Nos. 3, 4, and 7, 8, are disconnected with wrong (Ditthigata-vippayutta), the Nos. 2, 4, 6 and 8 are prompted (Sasańkhārika), while the Nos. 1, 3, 5, and 7 are unprompted (Asańkhārika).
The term Sasańkhārika is, sometimes, rendered into English as ‘induced’ ‘promoted’ etc., while the Asańkhārika means ‘un-induced’ ‘unprompted’ etc. We read from the Visuddhimagga as “It is Sasańkhārika when it is with consciousness which is sluggish and urged on. The Lobha- mūla citta which are Sasańkhārika can be promoted by advice or request of someone else or they arise promoted by one’s own deliberation.”259
Atthasalini giving an example of Lobha-mūlacitta accompanied by Ditthi which is Sasańkhārika states that a son of the noble family married a woman who has wrong view and thus he has associated with other people who has wrong view and then he gradually accepts their wrong view and they are pleasing to him.”260
2. The Two Kinds of Consciousness Rooted in Ill-will. (Dosamūla akusalacitta/patighacitta).
9. One consciousness unprompted, accompanied by displeasure and connected with ill-will (Domanassa-sahagatam patighasampayuttam asańkhārikam ekam).
10. One consciousness prompted and accompanied by displeasure and connected with ill-will (Domanassa-sahagatam patighasampayuttam sasańkhārikam ekam).261
Similarly the Dosamūlacittas are associated mainly with hatred (Dosa), jealousy (Issā), avarice (Macchaariya), and worry (Kukucca). They are said to arise due to having angry-habit (Dosajjhasayatā), lacking of the profound consideration (Agambhīrapakatitā), having a little study and training (Appassutā) and to facing of the objects of aversion (Āghāta-vatthu-sampayogā).262
3. The Two Kinds of Consciousness Rooted in Delusion (Mohamūla-akusalacitta/Mohamūlacitta)
11. One consciousness accompanied by indifference and connected with doubt (Upekkhā-sahagatam vicikicchāsampayuttam ekam)
12. One consciousness accompanied by indifference and connected with restlessness (Upekkhā-sahagatam uddhacca-sampayuttam ekam)263
The consciousness which are mainly associated with Moha (delusion), doubt and restlessness, etc., are called ‘Mohamūlacitta’. Another name of Moha is Avijjā, or Avidyā (Ignorance, not knowing, nescience) is said to be the primary cause of all misery and evil. To prevent and to veil the human’s mental eyes from seeing the true nature of things around is its main characteristic. In shot, it is called Avijjā because one, through the means of this, cannot realize the four noble truths (Caturāriya-saccāni).
According to Pāli-Abhidhamma, these twelve kinds of immoral consciousness are to be gradually eradicated by the four Noble men as follows :
The numbers 1, 2, 5 and 6 of consciousness rooted in greed (Lobha-mūlacitta) accompanied by wrong view and Nos. 11 of consciousness rooted in will-will accompanied by doubt are said to be rooted out by the Sotāpanna individuals (Stream-Enterer), because he has destroyed three fetters (Saññojana), i.e. Sakkāyaditthi (Self-illusion) and vicikicchā (doubt) and Sīlabbata-pāmāsa (indulgence in rites and ceremonies).
A sakadāgāmī (Once returner) who has attained the second stage of Sainthood weakens the potentiality of the 9th and 10th type of consciousness because he was said to attenuate the two kinds of fetters, i.e., Kāmarāga (sense desire) and patigha (hatred). The above mentioned two kinds of consciousness, i.e., No.8 and No. 10 are said to be eradicated by the Anāgāmī (Non-returner).
To the worthy One (Arahant), the twelve kinds of immoral consciousness have been eradicated completely, because he has exterminated the remaining five fetters namely attachment to the fine material sphere (Rūparāga), attachment to the non-material sphere (Arūpa-rāga), conceit (māna), restlessness (Uddhacca), and ignorance (avijjā).264
Strictly speaking, the Sotāpanna (noble person) has no view on self or Atman and has no any doubt about the Triple Gems (Tiratana) remained, therefore, the four Ditthigatasampayutta cittas and one Vicikicchā-sampayutta citta are annihilated. The remaining four Lobha-mūlacittas and Uddhaccasampayutta citta are said to be extirpated by Arahatta Magga, while the two kinds of Dosamūla citta are pulled up in the earlier Anāgāmī magga.
2.2.6. The Affinity of the five Aggregates (Khandhas)
Regarding the inseparability of the five groups discussed above, all the five khandhas rise wherein one depending upon the other. They do not endure as forms of being (or separate entities), independently of each other, but are bound together as forms of becoming (bhava), running into each other and mutually conditioning themselves. The khandha permitted as separated groups only in abstract. The analysis of the being into five khandhas is only for investigation and comprehension of the true nature of the being. A close affinity between saññā, vedanā sańkhāra is stated in the Majjhima-Nikāka thus :
Whatever, monks, there exists of feeling, of perception and of mental formations, these things are associated, not disassociated, and it is impossible to separate one from the other and show their difference. For whatever one feels, one perceives, and whatever one perceives, that one discriminates.289
The coherent whole of these five khandhas is aptly described in the Milindapañhā as follows : just as it is impossible to separate the ingredients of a syrup or a sauce (soup), similarly, the five khandhas which constitute the man’s personality, cannot be separated from one another.290
Buddhagosa explains the method of rendering the series of five khandhas as follows : Rūpa is mentioned first because it is easily comprehensible. As this rūpa gives rise to a feeling, so vedanā is treated as the next khandha. Then vedanā directs one’s attention to the form and nature of the source of the feelings and thereby generates saññā, so perception is placed next. After saññā, sańkhāra takes place leading the accumulation of mental states and hence it is treated as the fourth. Though viññāna really precedes vedanā forming as it does the basis of vedanā, it is mentioned last, as it is the most important khandha in the nāma group.
Thus, according to Buddhagosa, the real order of the khandhas is : rūpa, viññāna, vedanā, saññā and sańkhāra. The question arises, ‘why does Buddhaghosa mention viññānakhandha which was preached by the Buddha in the fifth order, as the second order?’ The reply is that when the consciousness- khandha has been understood, the remaining three khandhas are easy to understand, (tattha yasmā viññānakhandhe viññāte itare suvinneyya honti) ; consciousness is the basis of feeling, perception and mental formations, which are nothing but the contents of consciousness or psychic factors (cetasikas).291
It is necessary to note here that there is a difference between perception (saññā), mindfulness (sati) and remembering (anussati) : the anussati is a process whose main principle is saññā and sati. A part of saññā is that of anussati and another part of saññā is beyond the anussati. The same explanation can be applied for sati. But saññā and sati differ from each other. The former means the marking of a sense-object, when the sense-object is experienced again, saññā will compare the previous sense-object with the current one and it corresponds to each other, then it is called remembering. The latter means the controlling of the consciousness with the sense-object : it can pull the sense-object towards consciousness ; it has the capacity to remember the sense-object. For example, Mr. A and B are once well known to each other; later on they have to separate from each other. Afterwards they meet each other again and remember one another, this is called saññā. They further remember that they both used to travel together, this is called sati.
There are differences between saññā, paññā and viññāna which are classified according to saññakkhandha, sańkhārakkhandha and viññānakkhandha. All are concerned with the kind of knowledge, but are in different khandhas. Paññā is simply translated as understanding that helps to extend the scope of saññā and viññāna. Taking a rupee coin, for example, saññā is like the mere perception of a rupee coin by a man who discerns the value and utility of the coin, but he is not aware of its chemical composition. Viññāna is comparable to the ordinary man’s knowledge of the rupee. Paññā is like the analytical knowledge of a chemist who knows all its chemical properties in every details.292
It may be mentioned here that according to C.G.Jung, our mind is divided into three processes of recognition, evaluation and intuition. The first, by comparison, refers to saññā and viññāna, the second to the vedanā and the last to sańkhāra.293 Freud also divides consciousness into three divisions, namely, affection, conation and cognition, which correspond to vedanā, sańkhāra, and saññā and viññāna respectively.294 Both Jung and Freud acknowledge consciousness as an innate driving force called libido or the energy of psyche. This is opposed to the Upanisadic idea which holds that the real self of man is other than psyche, and that within each individual dwells the immortal spirit, which daily experiences the waking, dream and dreamless sleep states. Jung’s conception of the “Collective Unconscious” has a certain resemblance to the Buddhist view of sub-consciousness as the repository of the impressions of karma. According to Jung, man is said to be steeped in a world that was created by his own psyche ; he sees, hears, tastes, and smells the world and so is conscious of the world.295
We have seen that unlike Jung, Early Buddhism views the world as truly psycho-physical, that is, the five khandhas or the twelve āyatanas as : “Within this fathom-long body … equipped with saññā and mano, I proclaim the world to be ….”296 In the Samyutta-Nikāya the origin of the world is clearly explained by means of the perception-process ; Owing to the eye and eye-object, eye-consciousness will arise, the coming together of the three is contact and the dependent on contact is sensation….”297 It is clear that the Buddha’s view of the world and man is wider than Jung’s. The analysis of the five khandhas as their reality, which represent life as it is, is not complete in itself, for, as usual, we are dealing with life as directly concerned with the world. Therefore let us turn our attention to the analysis of six āyatanas in order to have clear understanding of life, according to the Buddhist contexts.
2.3. THE TWELVE ĀYATANAS
2.3.1. The Relation between Human Existence and The world
Although the life of a human being is essentially constituted of the five khandhas as already explained, nevertheless we are in a particular state of diary life or worldly experiences not directly concerned with them ; we are practically ignorant of them as they are not essential. But in reality they still function as they really are. The reason for this is that normally the process of living is mostly related to the world or the life in connection with the world, that which is classified under two parts, namely, (i) that part of perceiving or receiving the world through the six sense-doors, viz., eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind, which exist for the purpose of apprehending or sensing the world as appearing to human beings in various ways. These are formally called the ‘six sense objects’ (ārammanas), viz., visible object, sound, smell, taste, touch and mental object ; and (ii) Another part is that of performing with the world by the way of three channels of action, viz., body (kāyadvāra), speech (vacīdvāra) and mind (manodvāra), for reacting to the world in the three ways of ‘bodily action’ (kāyakamma), ‘verbal action’ (vacīkamma) and mental action (manokamma).
For this part, the emphasis is that the signified by the fourth khandha, that is, sańkhārakkhāndha as we have already discussed. But the term ‘sańkhāra’ here is newly classified in accordance with three characteristics : (i) from the point of its ‘expressing door’ it is named kāyasańkhāra, vacīsańkhāra and manosańkhāra ; (ii) from the aspect of being ‘representative’ it is known as kāyasañcetanā, vacīsañcetanā and manosañcetanā ; and (iii) from the characteristic of its ‘function’ it is of three kinds as kāyakamma, vacīkamma and manokamma. In short, the term ‘sańkhāra’ in this context refers to karma which will be separately discussed in detail in the sequel.
At present, we are dealing with the first part of the living-process as ‘the part of receiving the world through six doors (dvāra), in other words, six āyatanas’. We must bear in mind here that the word dvāra (door) in the working system of life-process is used instead of the word āyatana (bases or sources).
The analysis of Āyatanas also aims at penetrating into the true nature of phenomenal existence, as a second classification to khandhas. The word ‘āyatanas’ means ‘base’, perhaps, ‘source’ would be a more appropriate equivalent. Āyatana is described as a set of six internal sense-organs (ajjhattikāyatana) along with their corresponding numbers of sense-objects known as six external sense objects (bāhirāyatana), which constitute the bases of their respective types of consciousness. The āyatanas are therefore, twelve in number referred to as six internal sense bases and six external sense bases.298 The term ayatana also means the scope of faculty or sense-organ, when faculty is not functioning, say, ‘eye’, for example, in sleep, it is simply called dhātu, e.g. cakkhudhātu or cakkhavāyatana. But when it is functioning in this case, it is called ‘indriya’, such as, cakkhundriya.
Through a medium, that is, phassa ‘contract or sense-impression’ between the internal sense-bases and the external ones, we gain the knowledge (viññāna) of things or sense-objects.299 For example, the eye comes into contact with colour such as blue, then visual consciousness arises by mere awareness of the presence of this colour. We get the knowledge of colour because of the combination or conjunction of three constituents, viz., sense-organs, sense-objects and consciousness. The combination or conjunction of the three constituents is called phassa (contact). The phassa is of six kinds in accordance with six sense-organs. It is said that in the perceiving process phassa is the most important, because when phassa arises, the process goes on. The interesting thing next to phassa is vedanā (feeling) that arises due to the phassa. The vedanā is the perceiver or the feeler of the sense object. The diagrammatic representation will be as :
Āyatana + ārammana + viññāna = phassa à vedanā
2.3.2. The Combination of Khandhas, Āyatanas and Dhātus
It should be emphasized here that the term ‘khandhas’ in their second classification is known as āyatanas. The twelve āyatanas can also be classified into eighteen dhātus as in the process discussed above. The difference between āyatanas and dhātus exists only in the matter of arrangement of mental and material states in various ways. The point to be understood is that Buddhism admits mind as a sense-organ. Manāyatana stands as manodvāra (mind-door) of consciousness. The consciousness can reflect upon itself through mind-door ; without mind-door consciousness cannot know itself. Consciousness can grasp mental objects through mind-door, hence the consciousness is the consciousness of an object ; consciousness knows itself as an object, not as a subject. “That is, consciousness by nature is not self-conscious, it is not implicitly aware of itself as is aware of the objects.”300
Unlike the other schools of thought which admit five sense-organs with the exception of mind and accept the subjective consciousness, Buddhism admits six kinds of sense-organs and objective consciousness. According to Buddhism, the khandhas, āyatanas and dhātus have the same content, that is, their substancelessness. Again, the Buddhist term ‘dhātu’ covers both the conditioned (sańkhata) and unconditioned (asańkhata) things. The conditioned dhātus signify all living beings and objects of the world, but the unconditioned dhātus refer to space and Nirvana. The point is that the twelve āyatanas can be rendered into five khandhas as under : (i) the first five pairs of āyatanas from cakkhu and rūpa to kāya and photthabba are grouped in rāpakkhandha ; (ii) the sixth internal sense-organ, that is, Dhammāyatana is included in four khandhas, namely, in three nāmakhandhas (vedanā, saññā, and sańkhāra) and in rūpakkhandha (only the subtle elements) and also Nirvāna (which is free from the state of khandha).
The twelve āyatanas are further rendered into nāma-and-rūpa : of the twelve āyatanas, those that stand for the first five sense-organs and their respective sense-organs, cover only rūpa, that is, the material plane of existence being gross in nature, whereas manāyatana, that stands for the sixth sense organ, comprises viññānakkhandha, i.e. all the 89 or 121 types of consciousness. The eighteen dhātus also can be rendered into nāma-and- rūpa as follows : rūpa-group refers to the five sense-organs and their corresponding objects (Nos.1-5 and 7-11), whereas nāma-group means the seven numbers of 6 and 13-18, which represent the 89 or 121 kinds of consciousness, namely, (i) manodhātu (No.6) consist of three kinds of consciousness of which one is the pañcadvāravajjanacitta (the five sense-doors turning (for impressions) consciousness) ; and the other two kinds of sampat,icchannacitta (receiving (the object) consciousness), (ii) from cakkhuviññānadhātu to kāyaviññānadhātu (Nos.13-17), these five viññāna-dhātus contain two types each and hence represent ten types, and (iii) it is the manoviññānadhātu that includes the remaining seventy-six types of consciousness. This is the only difference between dhātu-group and āyatana-group. The remaining factors exhibit no material difference between the two groups.
As we have already seen, Buddhism admits two kinds of truths, of which one is conventional truth (sammutisacca) and the other one is ultimate truth (paramatthasacca). The former indicates things that are conventionalized by people for the sake of recognition. The things are not real in themselves, such as a man, a cat, a dog, etc., the latter refers to the ultimate truth or reality as they are. The Abhidhamma classifies the so-called ultimate truth into citta, cetasika, rūpa and Nibbāna. These states even without the convention exist according to their nature. The Theravāda Buddhist philosophy advocates that the first three states of ultimate truth known as five khandhas conditionally exist (sańkhatadhamma), the last one unconditionally exists (asańkhatadhamma). In this way the Theravada philosophy is called realism which upholds the reality of the ultimate truths as they are. As the Buddha said : Everybody, feeling, perception, mental activities, or consciousness, whatever be it past, future, present, inward, or outward, gross or subtle, low or high, far or near, it should be regarded as it really is by right insight.”301
2.4. Concluding Remark
The analysis of the being into five khandhas, on the one hand, and twelve āyatanas, on the other, is only for investigation an comprehension of the true nature of beings. The five khandhas and twelve āyatanas do not function in isolation in the way we have described. But we have discussed them in isolating one from another in order to comprehend their relative positions that constitute personality. We may briefly point out here that the personality can be viewed both in its synthetic and analytical aspects. When the four elements (mahābhūtarūpas) and the five khandhas take place, then we synthetically understand man. But when we analytically separate the constituents from one another, then the so-called personality disappears. The personality is constituted by nāma and rūpa, is in a state of flux. It is subject to the three characteristics of anicca, dukkha and anatta. The Buddha in his discourse on khandhas and āyatanas, presented in the khandhavagga302 and salāyatanavagga,303 characterized all the five khandhas and twelve āyatanas transitory in nature. The attachment to these khandhas and āyatanas can hardly yield anything, but suffering. The only escape from suffering, the Buddha recommends, is renunciation of ignorance, desire and attachment that rule over the domain of khandhas and āyatanas.
In studying nāma and rūpa, the following points should be brought into our notice. Theravāda Buddhism cannot be called materialism, because the materialists, like the Cārvākas and Ajita Kesakambala hold that the reality is one, that is, matter, the so-called mind or consciousness is the only product resulting from the proportional combination of matter.304 Unlike materialism, the Buddhist philosophy in the conventional sense admits the reality of both matter and consciousness. The consciousness or mind (citta) does not occur because of the mixture between the four elements, hence it does not disappear merely because of the dissolution of them. Buddhism cannot be called annihilationism (ucchedavāda) as well, because it accepts the doctrine of rebirth. However, by accepting the reality of citta, Buddhism cannot be regarded as idealism, which upholds only the existence of mind. For example, the idealists such as the Vijñānavādins of Yogācāra Buddhism assert that matter is nothing but idea that is created by citta ; mind alone exists, and the external world does not exist at all.305 The western idealist, Berkeley, said that ‘to be is to be perceived’, i.e. the existence of matter depends on the perception of citta.306 Theravāda Buddhist philosophy is not idealism, because it holds that matter or form really exists outside consciousness or name. This is tantamount to saying that no matter, whether citta thinks of the matter or not, the matter is still present in the external world ; matter is independent of the awareness of citta or viññāna.
Another thing is that though the Theravāda Buddhist philosophy accepted the reality of both consciousness (citta) and matter (vatthu) known as nāma and rupa, it is not dualism which holds that both mind and matter are real substances, that they equally exist, and are independent of other. Rene Descartes is a dualist. And he laid down that mind and body are two independent substances. The clear and distinct perception of the external world shows that it is extended. But extension is known only through our ideas of it.307 Matter has an extension for its nature of extension. The problem that cannot be solved in Descartes’ dualism is how do matter and mind that categorically differ from each other relate to each other? The Theravāda Buddhist philosophy does not face this problem, for it holds that nāma-and-rūpa or mind-and matter are not permanent, they always change in accordance with Tilakkhana. Moreover, nāma and rūpa dependently originate according to the doctrine of dependent origination. Nāma arises dependent on rūpa and rūpa on nāma, and their functions go on dependently just like the boat and the boatman, the lame and the blind and the sound and the drum.308 It is beautifully explained with a comparison of a marionette (dāruyanta) in the Visuddhimagga thus :
Just as marionette is void, soulless and without curiosity, and while it walks and stands merely through the combination of strings and wood, yet it seems as if it had curiosity and interestedness, so too, this mentality-materiality is void, soulless and without curiosity, and while it walks and stands merely through the combination of the two together, yet it seems as if it had curiosity and interestedness.309
In India, the Samkhya is also known as a typical representative of dualism just as does Cartesianism in the west. According to the Samkhaya, there two categories, prakrti and purusa that are different from each other. The former is conceived to be ‘matter’, while the latter to be ‘consciousness’. It also differentiates mind from consciousness, by regarding mind (antahkarana) as the product of prakrti. The relation between the self or consciousness and the mind is not rationally conceived by the Samkhya. If the purusa is infinite (vibhu), as mentioned by Samkhaya, how can it come into contact with a particular mind in exclusion to other minds? The purusa is immaterial ; if so, how can it be reflected in the mind or any aspect of it ? whereas the Samkhya regards both prakrti and purusa as external and unconditioned, in the view of Buddhist philosophy both matter and mind are ever-changing and conditioned.
In Buddhism, the terms “mind” and “consciousness” are one and the same, and there is no permanent entity that transcends them. The Buddhists have no problem in explaining the relation between nāma and rūpa as mentioned earlier. Moreover, according to the theory of relation (paccaya), consciousness is related to matter by way of pacchājāta-paccaya (the relation of post-existence), and matter to consciousness by means of purejāta-paccaya (the relation of pre-existence). That is, consciousness and its psychic factors arise after the arising of the body and the sense-organs and their objects must exist prior to arising of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness in the Buddhist philosophy is the knowledge of the objects.
Jainism, like Cartesianism and the Samkhya, advocates dualism, i.e. the doctrine of jīva and ajīva. Jīva or soul, according to Jainism, is in its pure existence all-conscious. But it is made unconscious by the covering of karma-puggala (the particle of matter). Jainism regards karma as matter that always binds the soul, hence Jainism always worries about freeing the soul from karma by self-mortification more than by the moral cultivation of soul. But unlike Jainism, Buddhism accepts karma as the state of mind, not that of the matter. There is no permanent soul, only the combination of nāma and rūpa that are related to karma (kammapaccaya). Buddhism regards karma as the co-existent state of nāma and rūpa, and it can be removed by the practice of insight.
The Theravāda Buddhist philosophy is not materialism or dualism, but realism in the sense that it recognizes the reality of consciousness and the external objects independent of their cognitions. It believes in the reality of consciousness and the reality of external world, but not in their permanence like dualism. Buddhism admits the reality of momentary consciousness and the objects. Consciousness is consciousness of the object (ārammanam cincetīti cittam).310 It occurs dependent on the objects; without the objects consciousness cannot arise.
As stated earlier, through the contact between sense organs and their corresponding objects arise consciousness. Consciousness, according to the realistic Buddhist philosophy, is not substance because the substantial thing will endure permanently by itself, but consciousness always undergoes change and it is impermanent and changes every moment, that is, it is subject to the law of Tilakkhana. According to the Theravāda Buddhist philosophy, not only consciousness but also matter arises and perishes every moment. The duration of matter in each moment lasts longer than that of consciousness, namely, the seventeen moments of consciousness is equivalent to a mere single moment of matter (tāni pana sattarasa cittakkhanāni rūpadhammanāmaya).311 The moment of consciousness is called consciousness-stream. Apart from the ever-flowing of mental stream, there is no soul which subsists as an unchanging entity. Like the modern psychologists, the Buddhists are concerned only with the ever-changing process of body and mind. But unlike the former, the latter holds That the flow of mental activities (cetanākamma) do not come at an end at the time of the death of the body. Residual effect of the past karmas are potentially present in the form of sańkhāras at every moment of consciousness-stream.
With the denial of permanence of mind and matter, the Theravāda Buddhist philosophy is, therefore, opposed to that of Puggalavāda ; Vijñānavāda ; and especially Upanisads which hold the permanence of soul known as Atman. As is mentioned earlier, the Buddha rejects the soul for the reason that its existence cannot be proved by means of experience, both mundane and super mundane. It is understood that the Buddha’s position is similar to that of the empiricist or experientialist. Hume, like the Buddha, rejects the existence of soul or self after analysing the notion of personal identity. While Hume destroys the concept of mind as set forth in Berkely’s idealism, the Buddha disproves the idea of self in the Upanisad’s idealism. Hume’s analysis has similarities to that of the Buddha in several respects. The concepts of “impression” and “idea” can be compared with that of “vedanā” and “saññā”. The most important similarity between Hume and the Buddha is their discovery that human reason is the slave of the passions.312 The Buddha concentrates on human being and finds nothing, but the ever-changing elements of nāma and rūpa, then he concludes thus : “All recluses and brāhmins who regard the soul in diverse ways, regard it as the body-mass of five khandhas based on attachment or as one of them.313 In the Samyutta-Nikāya, Khemaka Thera, when asked by Dasaka Bhikkhu whether in this five khandhas he discerns the self or anything pertaining to the self, replies thus : “In these five khandhas, friend, I discern no-self nor anything pertaining to the self.314 Hume, like the Buddha, rejects the existence of the self, because he cannot discover it after reflecting upon it, what he finds is the ever-changing perception, then he concludes thus :
Setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perceptual flux and movement… there is no any single power of the soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment… there is no any single power of the soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment… there is properly no simplicity in it at one time, not identity in different, whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that, the comparison of the theatre must not mislead us, they are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind.315
However, Hume fails to explain the connection among the distinct perceptions, as he confesses thus : “In short, there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent, namely, ‘that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives a real connection among distinct existences… For my part, I must plead the privilege of a skeptic, and confess that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding”.316 Hume’s dilemma was solved by the Buddha 2500 years ago by the elaborate ‘Law of Relations’ (paccaya), called Paticcasamuppāda, which will be stated in detail in the sequel. Hume, like the Buddha, sets aside metaphysics and contends that the self is a product of man’s propensity to obsessions, or illusion (vipallāsa) according to the Buddhist terminology, but the Buddha goes even further by providing its solution : “Whatever, monks, is the origin of the number of obsessions and perceptions which assail a man, if there is nothing to rejoice, to welcome, to catch hold of, this is itself an end of a propensity to attachment, to repugnance… to ignorance, this is itself an end of taking a weapon, … of lying speech”. We can say that the Buddha’s analysis of experience is for the purpose of eradicating that experience, while Home intends the improvement of understanding and the sharpening of perception.317
The problem of personal identity is solved by the Buddha with the help of the doctrine of Dependent Organization. The personal-identity process is nothing but that of perception. The process of perception is also known as the process of rebirth. The process of rebirth is the process of name and form. To know the latter, the doctrine of Dependent Origination should be taken into account at length.
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85 Luang Suriyabong, Buddhism : An Introduction (Colombo : The Lanka Bodha Mandalaya, n.d.), p.5.
86 S. Radhakhishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 1929 ; rpt. (Bombay : Blackie & Son Publishers, 1985), pp.386-389 ; Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, The Birth of Indian Psychology and Its Development in Buddhism (London : Luzac & Co., 1936), pp.203, 218 and 222.
87 Bukkyo Dendo kyokai, The Teaching of Buddha (Tokyo : Kosaido Printing Co., Ltd., 1982), p.174.
88 DN. III. 275.
89 Dh. V. 248 : “Evambho purisa jānāhi pāpadhamma asuññatā mā tam lobho adhammo ca ciram dukkhāya randhayum.”
90 K. K. Mittal, “Concept of Man : The Buddhist View”, IPA. Vol. 15 (1982-83), p. 89.
91 Mrs. Rhys Davids, The Birth of Indian Psychology and Its Development in Buddhism. (London : Luzac & Co., 1936), pp. 12-13.
92 Vbh. 1 ; DhsA. 52 ; DN. I. 223 ; II. 32,34 ; SN. I. 12.
93 Sn. 1074.
94 Comp. 81 ; Phrarajavaramuni, A Dictionary of Buddhism, p. 130.
95 Vbh. 87 ; Vism. 484 ; Comp. 183 ; Visuddhi. 3.65 ; Sańgaha. 44.
96 Vbh. 122 ; Vism. 491 ; Comp. 175 ; Visuddhi. 3.72 ; Sańgaha. 41.
97 MN. III. 31 ; 260 ; 240.
98 AN. I. 93.
99 DN. II. 49 ; Dh. V. 183 ; Dialogues of the Buddha, II. 38.
100 Dh. V. 321 ; The Dhammapada, Trans. by Nārada, p. 251.
101 Dh. V. 97.
102 Dh. V. 103.
103 Phrarajavaramuni, Buddha-Dhamma, pp. 897-901.
104 MN. I. 133.
105 SN. V. 437.
106 Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, SN. V. 420.
107 SN. V. 417-418 ; The Kindred Sayings, V. 352-355.
108 The Kindred Sayings, V. 356.
109 Ibid., 372.
110 SN. V. 436.
111 Pandeya, Indian Studies in Philosophy, op. cit., p.198.
112 Nyanaponika (Ed.), Buddhist Dictionary : Manual of Buddhist Terms and Doctrines, (Kandy : BPS. 1980), p. 99 ; Cf. S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, I. (Delhi ; MB, 1975), p. 93.
113 T.W. Rhys Davids (Ed.), Pāli-English Dictionary (Delhi : Oriental Reprint : Munshiram Manohalal, 1975).
114 SN. I. 135 ; The Kindred Sayings, III. 41 ; DN. II. 307 ; Vbh. I. 170 : “Yathā hi ańgasambhārā, hoti saddo ratho iti ; evam khanhesu santesu, hoti satto ti sammati.”
115 SN. III. 48 ; The Kindred Sayings, III. 41 ; DN. II. 307 ; Vbh. I. The Book of Analysis, pp. 1-16 ; Comp. p. 185 ; MN. III. ; Vism. 443.
116 The Book of Analysis (Vibhańga), Tr. P. A. Thittila, p. xxii.
117 Nyānatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, p. 99.
118 SN. III. 139.
119 SN. IV. 196. “Evam eva kho … bhikkhu rūpam samanesati yāvatā rūpassa gati, vedanam … saññam … sańkhāre … viññānam samenesati yāvatā viññānassa gati, … ahan ti vā mamanti vā asmiti vā tam pi tassa na hoti.”
120 MN. III. 16.
121 SN. III. 101.
122 SN. III. 101 ; The Kindred Sayings, III. P. 87.
123 SN. III. 128, 167 ; AN. V. 109. “Na kiñci attānam vā attaniyam vā pañcesu upādānakkhandesu.”
124 MN. I. 191 ; SN. III. 115.
125 SN. I. 134. “Khadhā ca dhātus cha ca āyatanā ime hetum paticca sambhūtā hetubhańgā nirujjhare.”
126 SN. III. & SN. IV. ; MN. No. 28 ; 62.
127 The word “khandha” is used in the Chāndogya Upanisad, II. 23, in the sense of branches.
128 The etymological explanation is : rūpyata iti rūpa۬m, i.e. matter is what materializes. Different meanings are then given of this materializing : pressure, pain, disappearance, or change. Thus matter is something that disappears. The real meaning is impenetrability (sa-patighata), which is further variously explained. Kumāralābha gives to the phenomenon of impenetrability an idealistic interpretation : “the impossibility for the same space”.
129 SN, I. 101.
130 SN. III. 62. “Cattāro ca mahābhūtā catunnam ca … idam vuccati … rūpam. āhārasamudayo rūpasamudayo.”
131 MN. I. 190. “Atthim ca pat,icca nāhāram ca paticca mamsam ca paticca cammam…”
132 Khandha Yamaka, I. p.16.
133 Dhammasańganī, E. Mullur (Ed.), pp.124-179.
134 Milind. 281 ; Atthasālinī, p. 274 ; Vism. pp.309-315.
135 MN. II. 262.
136 Comp. 154-157.
137 DN. II. 294. ; Vism. 347. “Pathavī-dhātu, āpo-dhātu, tejodhātu and vāyo-dhātu.”
138 Ab. K., I, 10.
139 Ab. K., I, 36.
140 Ibid.
141 Ab. K., I, 37.
142 Quoted in The Path of Freedom, Rev. N. R. M. Thera, (Kandy : BPS., 1977), p. 199.
143 Buddhism in Translation, Tr. H.C. Warren (London : Harvard University Press), p.79.
144 Ab. K., I, 12.
145 Ab. K., I, 13.
146 MN. I. 57, 184-185 ; MN. III. 90 ; DN. II. 293-294 ; Vism. 353-359 ; Vbh. 193. “Atthi imasmin kāye kesā lomā, nakhā, dantā, taco, mamsam, nahārū, atthi, atthimiñjam ; vakkam, hadayam, yakanam, kilomakam, pihakam, papphāsam, antam, antagunam, undariyam, karīsam …” (Matthalunga does not appear in this stanza) . See also The Middle Length Sayings, I. 231 ff ; The Path of Purification, p. 386-391.
147 “Iti kesa nāma imasmim sarīre pātiyekko kotthāso acetano abyakato suñño nissatto thaddho. …” Visuddhi. II. 171 ff ; The Path of Purification, p. 386-391.
148 Vism. 359 ; Visuddhi. II. 180-185 ; The Path of Purification, p. 392-395.
149 MN. I. 188 ; Vism. 363 ; The Path of Purification, p.395 : (Visuddhi. II. 185 : “Yena santappati… yena jariyati… yena parideyhati… yena asitapītakhāyitasāyitam sammā parināmam gacchati.”)
150 MN. I. 188.
151 Vism. 363 ; The Path of Purification, p. 395.
152 MN. I. 188 ; Vism. 363 ; Netti., 74.
153 MN. I. 189 ; The Middle length Sayings, I. pp. 235-236.
154 Vism. 363.
155 Dhammasangani, pp. 224-225 : “Kakkhalat,ā eva pat,havi, sineho bandhattam rūpassa, unahattam tejo, thambhitattam vāyo”.
156 Vism., 365.
157 Vism., 364 ; The Path of Purification, p. 397.
158 The Abhidharma Samyukta Sańgīti, 1-2a. Quoted in W.M. McGovern, A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy (Lucknow : Oriental reprinters, 1976), p. 117.
159 Sańgaha., p. 33-34 ; Vism., 444.
160 Ibid.
161 It is uncounted number owing to its identity with three primary elements of the afore-mentioned mahābhūtas, namely, earth, fire and air.
162 SN. IV. 225 ; The Kindred sayings, IV. 144-145.
163 Vbh. p.336.
164 Vism. 447 (XIV. 59) ; The Path of Purification, pp. 496-498 : where the reason of non-mentioning the word hadayavatthu in the Tipitakas is clearly explained.
165 Sańgaha-T,īkā, p. 195 : Hadayameva manodhātu mano-viññānadhātu nissayattā vatthu cāti hadayavatthu”.
166 Dhammasańganī, 635 ; Mrs. Rhys Davids, A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, p.192 ; Vism., XIV. 59.
167 Sańgaha-T,īkā, 196.
168 Dhammasańganī, 144.
169 Sańgaha-Tīkā, 196. “Na kassatīti ākāso ākāso yeva ākāso. Nijjivatthena dhātu cāti ākāsadhātu.”
170 MN. III. 31 ; 240 ; 260.
171 Vbh., pp. 84-85.
172 Dhammasańganī, pp.665, 718 ; Milinda. 229 ; Vism., 448.
173 Dhammasańganī, p.174 ; Vism., 449.
174 The Path of Purification, pp. 500-501.
175 Dhammasańganī, 642, 732, 865 ; Vism. 449.
176 The Path of Purification, pp.500-502.
177 Visuddhi., III. 20 ; Vism., 451.
178 Sańgaha Tīkā. 196.
179 Vism. 448-490.
180 SN., III. 38.
181 MN., I. 293.
182 Ud., 1, 3.
183 SN. III. 101 ; The Kindred Sayings, III. 86.
184 SN. IV. 235.
185 DN. III. 216.
186 Vism. 460.
187 The Path of Freedom (Vism.), ED. By Dr. D. Roland, D. Weerasuria, p. 246.
188 SN. IV. 232.
189 SN. III. 232.
190 The Path of Freedom, p.246.
191 Bhuddhaghosa, The Expositor (Atthasālinī), p. 145.
192 Vism. 460.
193 SN. IV. 207.
194 SN. IV. 232.
195 MN. I. 293.
196 MN. I. 293 : “Sañjānāti sañjānāti kho… tasmā saññā ti vuccati, kiñ ca sañjānāti, nīlakampi, pītakampi, lohitakampi, odātampi”.
197 DN. II. 309.
198 Vism., p. 246-247 ; cf. Vbh., 6, where saññā is divided into two, viz., patighasamphassajā and adhivacanasamphassajā.
199 Ibid., p. 246-247.
200 Rakesranjan Sarma, “The Buddhist Theory of Perception”, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. V. No. 3 (1929), pp. 214-243.
201 AN. III. 280 ; DN. III. 281.
202 DN. III. 220 ; AN. V. 211.
203 SN. III. 15 ; 45.
204 DN. I. 12 ; MN. I. 167 ; Atakkāvacaro. DN. I. 12 : “Ye tathāgato sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti”.
205 AN. I. 189 ; MN. I. 265.
206 MN. II. 211 ; cf. K.N. Jayatileke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963), pp. 169, 451.
207 R. Sarma, “The Buddhist Theory of Perception”, p. 215.
208 MN. III. 260.
209 Ud., 77. The verses of Uplift, p.93, where papañca is rāga-dosa-moha-, tanhā-māna-ditthi ; and F.L. Woodward said : Things are just one thinks them”.
210 Netti., 37.
211 MN. I. 65.
212 SN. IV. 203 ; AN. IV. 68 ; AN. II. 161.
213 AN. III. 294.
214 AN. II. 162 ; The Gradual Sayings, II. 169.
215 AN. II. 52.
216 SN. II. 73 ; The Kindred Sayings, II. 51.
217 SN. IV. 74 ; The Kindred Sayings, IV. 44.
218 SN. I. 135.
219 Dh., V. 227 ; 278.
220 SN. III. 60.
221 AN. III. 415.
222 Sańgaha., ch., II. 1 ; Sańgaha-Tīka. 98 : “Ekuppādānirodhā ca ekālumbanavatthukā ; cetoyuttā dvipaññāsa dhammā cetasikā matā.”
223 M.I. 36 ; A.IV. 249.
224 Dhs. 75.
225 Attha. p. 382 ; DhsA. 250.
226 Sańgaha. Ch.II. p.7 ; Abhs. II. 2 p.6.
227 Sańgaha. p. 10 ; Abhs.II. 17 p.9, Compendium p. 102.
228 Phrasaddhammajotika (Paramatthajotikā), (in Thai) op. cit. p.53-54.
229 Dhs. 9.
230 Attha. pp.229-230 ; DhsA. p. 234 ; According to Visiddhimagga there are only thirty six kinds of mental states, i.e. twenty seven niyatas, four yevāpanakas and five aniyatas mental states for vedanā and saññā are excluded. See Visuddhi. III. p.36 ; Vism. 402.
231 Attha. p. 226 ; Dhs A. 132.
232 Sańgaha. p. 7 ; Abhs.II. 2 p. 6.
233 Sańgaha. p.7 ; Abhs. II. 2. p. 6.
234 Edward Conze, in this book entitled Buddhist Thought in India (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), pp. 110, 116, selects to define the term consciousness in three views, viz., (1) pure awareness (viññāna), (2) thought (citta), and (3) mind (manas).
In the Dhammasańganī, consciousness can be called by ten different names, viz., citta, mano, manas, hadaya, pandara, manāyatana, manindriya, viññāna, viññānakkhandha and manoviññānadhātu. (Dhs. 6).
235 Nārada, A Manual of Abhidhamma, p.9.
236 DN. I. 223 ; MN. III. 31 ; 260, 240.
237 Atthasālinī, p. 53 ; Comp., Vism., 452.
238 SN. III. 87 ; MN. I. 292.
239 MN. I. 3-4 ; AN. I. 10.
240 Dh., 33, 36, 37.
241 Vism., XV. 488-489.
242 Patthāna, I. 3.
243 Patthāna, I. 4.
244 SN. III. 61.
245 Cf. The Path of Purification, Tab. III. pp. 881-882.
246 M. II. 26 : “Katamamํ cittam Cittampi hi bahu anekavidham nānāpakaram yam cittam sarāgam sadosam samoham.”
247 D.III. 243, Vbh. 85.
248 S.III. 47.
249 Abhs. p.1.
250 Dhirasekera, Jotika, Encyclopedia of Buddhism. Vol. IV. Sri Lanka : The Government of Sri Lanka, 1979, p. 174.
251 Dhs. 10.
252 Dhirasekera, J., op.cit., p. 175.
253 Vbh. p.53.
254 Vbh. 306-307.
255 Attha. p. 420, DhsA. p. 282, Visuddhi. III. p.70 ; Vism. p. 488.
256 Sańgaha. p. 1 ; Abhs. P.1 ff, Compendium p.81.
257 Ibid. And also see Phrasaddhammajotika (Paramatthajotikā), (In Thai) Bangkok, 2513 B.E. p. 13 f.
258 Sańgaha. Ch. I p.1 ; Abhs. I. 2. p.1 Compendium pp. 82-83 ; Dhs. pp. 75-83.
259 Visuddhi. III. p. 23 ; Vism. 453 “Samsīdamano vā parehi vā ussahito karoti … imasmim hi at the sańkhāroti etam attano vā paresam vā vasena pavattassa pubbayogassa’ dhivacanam.”
260 Attha. p. 388 ; Dhs A. p.255.
261 Sańgaha. p. 1, Compendium p. 83.
262 B. Medhangur and V. Vaidayasevee, Kumuakansuksa-phra-abhidhammatthasangaha (in Thai) op. cit. (Vol. I) p.38.
263 Sańgaha. pp. 1-2 ; Abhs. I. p.1, Compendium p. 88 ; Dhs. pp. 85-86.
264 See Narada Mahathera, A Manual of Abhidhamma, op. cit. p. 26-27.
289 MN, I. 293. “Yam hi… vedeti tam sañjānāti, yam sañjānāti tam vijānāti. The term vijānāti refers to samkāra or viññāna,” See also Nyānatiloka’s Buddhist Dictionary, p. 101.
290 Milind., 63.
291Vism., 452.
292 A Manual of Abhidhamma, p. 85.
293 C. G. Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, pp. 140-141.
294 P. P. Mererk, Selflessness in Satre’s Existentialism and Early Buddhism, p.106 ; Swami Satprakashananda, The Goal and the Way, p. 169.
295 C.G. Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, pp. 140, 384.
296 AN, II. 48.
297 SN. II. 73.
298 DN. III. 243 ; MN. III. 216.
299 Comp., 183 ; Vism., 484.
300 P. P. Mererk, Selflessness in Satre’s Existentialism and Early Buddhism. p. 176.
301 SN. III. 68.
302 SN. III. 1-36.
303 SN. IV. 1-6.
304 S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, I. pp. 275-279 ; A.L. Basham, History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas, pp.15, 17, where Ajita Kesakambala was believed to be the forerunner of the later Cārvakas.
305 A.K. Chatterjee, The Yogācāra Idealism, (Delhi : MB, 1987), p. 45.
306 Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy, (New York : Pocket Books, 1953), p.257 ; D. M. Datta, Contemporary Philosophy, p. 251 ; Y. Masih, A Critical History of Modern Philosophy (Delhi : MB, 1983), pp. 171-172 ; John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, p. 507.
307 Frederick Mayer, A History of Modern Philosophy, pp. 115, 117 ; W. H. Walsh, Metaphysics (London ; Hutchinson University, n.d.), p. 50.
308 Vism., 595, 596, 597 ; Visuddhi., III. 217, 218, 219.
309 Vism., 594, 595 ; Visuddhi., III. 216.
310 DhsA., 63.
311 Sańgaha., 20.
312 N.P. Jacobson, Buddhism : The Relation of Analysis, p. 164.
313 SN. III. 46 ; The Kindred Sayings, III. 41.
314 SN. III. 137.
315 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Ed. Selby Bigge (London : Clarendon Press, 1896), pp. 252-253.
316 Ibid., p.163.
317 N. P. Jacobson, Buddhism : The Religion of Analysis, p. 163.